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Filed: May 21, 2018 at 9:28 AM.
Fifth Judicial District, Minidoka County
By: Michelle Perry Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA
Victor Rodger Bliss
vs.
Minidoka Irrigation District

Case No. CV-2017-334

JUDGE: Tribe, Michael P

DATE: May 21, 2018

CLERK: Michelle Perry

LOCATION:

HEARING TYPE: Scheduling Conference

COURT REPORTER:

Court Minutes

INTERPRETER:

Parties Present:
Minidoka Irrigation District

Attorney:

Jonathan R. Grover

Attorney:

Sam L. Angel

Hearing Start Time: 9:02 AM
Journal Entries:
- Court calls case, Attorneys are present by phone. Need to set a trial date. Court inquires of Mr.
Grover for dates.
Mr. Grover replies, first weeks of December.
Mr. Angel replies, in trial first part of December. Ask the court for February
Court Feb 5th. 4 day trial. Jury Trial. Pre-Trial January 7th 9 am. Ok for Telephonic
appearance. Plaintiff call Council and then call court.
Mr. Angel inquires of the court a new scheduling order?
Court inquires of Mr. Grover.
Mr. Grover replies.
Mr. Angel replies.
Court will craft scheduling order and get it out by tomorow. Working on Summary Judgment by
first of next week.
Mr. Grover inquires of court that, both parties turned in Pre-Trial order there were some
differences. Inquires of court if there was good cause.
Court states will listen to hearing again.
Court inquires, do need to make amended Scheduling Order.

COURT MINUTES (Criminal)
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Mr. Grover replies.
Court will listen to Hearing.
Hearing End Time: 9:16 AM

COURT MINUTES (Criminal)
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Filed: June 18, 2018 at 9:57 AM
Fifth Judicial District, Minidoka County
By: Michelle Perry Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA
Victor Rodger Bliss
vs.
Minidoka Irrigation District

Case No. CV-2017-334

JUDGE: Tribe, Michael P

DATE: June 18, 2018

CLERK: Michelle Perry

LOCATION: District Courtroom 1

HEARING TYPE: Status Conference

COURT REPORTER: Patty Hubbell

Court Minutes

INTERPRETER:

Parties Present:
Angell, Sam L
Grover, Jonathan R.

Attorney of
Record
Attorney of
Record

Parties:
Victor Rodger Bliss

Attorney:

Jonathan R. Grover

Minidoka Irrigation District

Attorney:

Sam L Angell

Hearing Start Time: 9:48 AM
Journal Entries:
- Court calls case, counsel present by phone,
Court comments that exhibit 11 identifies witness list with Judge Tribe’s name on it, would
excuse self if any party demands
Mr. Grover inquires if Court had any dealings
Court replies, no involvement
Mr. Grover will speak with client and get back by end of week
Court had no involvement in case, but will wait to hear by end of week.
Mr. Angell agrees
Court comments, by Friday, let clerk in Minidoka know if Judge needs to disqualify himself

Hearing End Time: 09:52 AM

COURT MINUTES

1
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Filed: 06/27/2018 08:34:42
Fifth Judicial District, Minidoka County
Tonya Page, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Perry, Michelle

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA

VICTOR BLISS,

Plaintiff,
Vs.
MINIDOKA IRRIGATION DISTRICT,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2017-334

ORDER TO DISQUALIFY

COMES NOW, Michael P. Tribe, District Judge in the above-entitled court and does
hereby disqualify himself in the above-entitled cases and petitions and requests the
Administrative Judge to appoint another District Judge to hear the entitled case.
Signed: 6/26/2018 05:39 PM

DATED this _ _ _ day of _ _ _ _ , 2018

~ p. 7~
Michael P. Tribe, District Judge

ORDER TO DISQUALIFY WITHOUT CAUSE
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1

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ___
_ _ _ , 2018, I served a true,
27th of _ _June
correct copy of the ORDER TO DISQUALIFY upon the following in the manner provided:
Jonathan Grover
jgrover@egb-law.com

X Email

Sam L Angel
sla@hasattomeys.com

X Email

Cheri Mattson
Trial Court Administrator
cmattson2co. twinfalls.id. us

X Email

Tonya Page
Clerk of the District Court
By _ _
_____
Michele
Perry
_ _ _ __
Deputy Clerk

ORDER TO DISQUALIFY WITHOUT CAUSE
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Filed: 06/27/2018 13:28:49
Fifth Judicial District, Minidoka County
Tonya Page, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Perry, Michelle

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA

Victor Rodger Bliss
vs.
Minidoka Irrigation District

Case No. CV-2017-334
Order of Assignment by Administrative
District Judge
Event Code: ORAA

The above-entitled is assigned to the Honorable John K. Butler, District Judge for all further
proceedings.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: June 27. 2018
udge
mi
Fifth Judicial District

ORDER OF ASSIGNMENT BY ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICT JUDGE
CV CR FL PR (OR26) (Appv.02.23.16)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on this day I served a copy of the attached to:
Blake G. Hall

bgh@hasattorneys.com

[X] E-mail

Sam LAngell

sla@hasattorneys.com

[X] E-mail

Jonathan R. Grover

jgrover@egb-law.com

[X] E-mail

Minidoka Irrigation District

✓ Bymail

98 West 50 South

[ ] By e-mail

RupertlD 83350

[ ] Bv fax (number) #_

[ ] Courthouse box
Victor Rodger Bliss

✓ Bymail

289 North 850 West

[ ] By e-mail

Paul ID 83347

[ ] By fax (number) #_

2018
__
___
_ _27th,
Date: _June

Michelle Perry

By: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Deputy Clerk

ORDER OF ASSIGNM ENT BY ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICT JUDGE
CV CR FL PR (OR26) (Appv.02.23.16)
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Filed: 07/10/2018 10:05:22
Fifth Judicial District, Minidoka County
Tonya Page, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Perry, Michelle

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA
VICTOR RODGER BLISS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MINIDOKA IRRIGATION DISTRICT,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2017-334

______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER ADVISEMENT
______________________________________________________________________________
On June 27, 2018 the above entitled matter was assigned to the Honorable John K.
Butler, District Judge after the disqualification of the Honorable Michael P. Tribe, District Judge.
At the time of reassignment, Judge Tribe had the defendant’s motion for summary judgment
under advisement for a decision. A decision on the summary judgment motion has not yet been
entered.
The parties have agreed that this Court may listen to the digital recording of the oral
argument pertaining to the motion for summary judgment in lieu of rescheduling a hearing on the
pending motion. This Court will take the motion for summary judgment under advisement upon
receipt of the digital recording of the prior hearing and a decision will be issued within 30 days
of the Court’s receipt of the digital recording.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: 7/9/2018 04:46 PM
DATED: _________________________

__________________________________________
John K. Butler, District Judge

1 - ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER ADVISEMENT
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
document has been served as shown below on counsel of record (or self-represented party, if
any) on _________________________:
July 10, 2018
Via Email
Jonathan R. Grover
Attorney for Plaintiff
jgrover@egb-law.com
Sam L. Angell
Attorney for Defendant
sla@hasattorneys.com

_______________________
Michelle Perry
Deputy Clerk

2 - ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER ADVISEMENT
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Filed: 08/06/2018 16:33:22
Fifth Judicial District, Minidoka County
Tonya Page, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Sunderland, Janet

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA
VICTOR RODGER BLISS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MINIDOKA IRRIGATION DISTRICT,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2017-334

______________________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
______________________________________________________________________________
On April 23, 2018 the defendant’s motion for summary judgment came on regularly for
hearing. Counsel Jonathan R. Grover appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff. Counsel Sam L. Angell
appeared on behalf of the Defendant. Subsequent to the hearing the Honorable Michael P. Tribe,
District Judge was disqualified and the matter was reassigned to the Honorable John K. Butler,
District Judge. On July 13, 2018 the Court received the digital recording of the oral argument on
the motion for summary judgment.
The Court having reviewed the evidence filed in support of and in opposition to summary
judgment as well as Counsel’s Briefs and the digital recording of the hearing, now issues the
following decision on summary judgment.

1 - MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The plaintiff, Victor Rodger Bliss (Bliss) owns 75.87 acres of agricultural land located
within the boundaries of the Minidoka Irrigation District (MID). The defendant, MID is an
irrigation district formed pursuant to I.C. § 43-101 et seq. MID stores and delivers irrigation
water to its members having a water right appurtenant to their property. MID also is responsible
to repair and maintain its canals, ditches and structures to deliver water to its members. Each
member has a head gate or valve at a point of diversion, where the member can obtain water for
their property in coordination with ditch rider employed by MID. Bliss has a head gate for the
diversion of water to his property.
In 1998, MID moved a canal that ran along Bliss’ property. In the process it was
necessary for MID to excavate and deposit soil. MID claims that the soil excavated was
deposited on the canal bank within the district right of way. Bliss contends that the soil was
excavated and deposited on his property and as a result the soil partially covered and/or
destroyed his boundary fence. MID claims that the soil was deposited within its right-of-way.
Since the year 2000, Bliss has leased his property to and the property is farmed by Alan
and Debra Woodland (Woodland). The current lease will terminate the end of 2018. Bliss
receives rent from Woodland of approximately $98,000.00. There is no dispute that the plaintiff
has received all of the rent required to be paid under the terms of his leases. There is not
evidence or claim of crop damage in this pending action.
Bliss was dissatisfied with the efforts of MID in the control and elimination of noxious
weeds in the vicinity of the MID canals/laterals. Between May and July of 2015 he incurred time
and expense in the spraying of noxious weeds, that he believes should have been done by MID.
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On or about July 23, 2015 he sent and Invoice to MID in the sum of $2,015.00. The MID board
discussed the Invoice at its meeting on August 11, 2015 and the Board voted against paying the
invoice. Bliss was advised of the Board’s action by letter from the Board’s attorney dated August
12, 2015. Bliss then retained counsel to respond to the August 12, 2015 letter. On September 9,
2015 counsel for Bliss sent a letter to counsel for the MID which indicated that (1) Bliss should
be reimbursed $2,015.00 because MID had not carried out its duty to control weeds and maintain
its canals and laterals and (2) that Bliss was mitigating his own damages to prevent the further
spread of noxious weeds. Counsel for Bliss also notified counsel for MID that due to the poor
maintenance by MID, a lateral overflowed onto Bliss’ crops. There was a further exchange of
correspondence between counsel in October and November of 2015. Bliss has never filed any
tort claim for any crop loss.
On June 29, 2016 Bliss met with Frank Hunt a member of the MID board about concerns
the plaintiff had regarding the amount of water his property was receiving. Hunt acknowledged
that Bliss needed some additional water and it was Hunt’s expectation that Bliss would open his
head gate a little more to allow additional water to flow or contact the ditch rider for additional
water. On June 30, 2016 Hunt discovered that Bliss had cut the lock on the check valve
controlling water to downstream water users and shut if off which resulted in no water to the
downstream water users. The actions of Bliss were alleged to have been observed by others.
As a result of Bliss shutting off water to downstream water users, MID reported the
conduct of Bliss to the Minidoka County Sheriff. Deputy Ron Stumph took witness statements of
MID employees or board members Vance Johnson, Ruth Bailes, Dan Davidson and Frank Hunt.
Following the investigation by the Minidoka County Sheriff’s Office, the Minidoka County
Prosecutor filed a misdemeanor complaint against Bliss on July 28, 2016. Bliss was charged with
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Wrongful Diversion of Water, I.C. § 18-4304. After Bliss paid restitution in the sum of $75.00
the case was dismissed on or about October 31, 2016. Bliss incurred costs and attorney fees for
his defense.
On February 28, 2017 Bliss through his attorney sent a Notice of Tort Claim to MID. The
conduct complained of is the circumstances of the events of June 30, 2016 which resulted in the
filing of a misdemeanor complaint for wrongful diversion of water. Bliss alleged that the
criminal prosecution was the result of false statements of MID employees or board members and
that as a result of the conduct of MID he was wrongfully prosecuted and defamed and incurred
damages to his reputation as well as costs of his defense. The claim as presented on its face does
not assert any claim for trespass or breach of fiduciary duty or infliction of emotional distress on
the part of MID or its employees or board members. The claim as presented was denied.
On April 17, 2017 the plaintiff, Victor Rodger Bliss (Bliss) filed an unverified complaint
against the defendant, Minidoka Irrigation District (MID) for Count I – Breach of Contract
(failure to deliver water and/or failure to maintain and repair its ditches, canals and laterals);
Count II – Breach of Fiduciary Duty (failure to deliver water and/or failure to maintain and
repair its ditches, canals and laterals); Count III – Trespass (intentional placement of dirt, soil
and other items from its canals on Bliss’ property without legal right or authority); Count IVDeclaratory Relief (to declare Bliss’ right to delivery of water; control of noxious weeds; and
open meetings of the directors); and Count V – Wrongful Prosecution/Infliction of Extreme
Emotional Distress (plaintiff was wrongfully prosecuted based on false fact or statements of the
defendant).
On May 22, 2017 MID filed its Answer and Counterclaim and an Amended Answer and
Counterclaim on May 25, 2017. The counter claim in part alleges that the plaintiff has trespassed
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on the MID property with a crossing over a canal that was placed by the plaintiff without
permission of MID and that the crossing is alleged to be an encroachment.
On March 6, 2018 MID filed its motion for summary judgment. MID argues that it is
entitled to summary judgment on the claims of Breach of Fiduciary Duty; Trespass; and
Wrongful Prosecution/Infliction of Extreme Emotional Distress because the plaintiff has failed to
file a notice of a tort claim. I.C. § 6-906; 9-607. MID also argues that (1) plaintiff has failed to
establish a breach of fiduciary duty as a matter of law; (2) that the claims of breach of fiduciary
duty and trespass are barred by the applicable statute of limitations; (3) that MID is immune from
any trespass liability or the plaintiff has not established the essential elements of trespass; (4)
MID is immune from liability for wrongful prosecution and/or plaintiff has not established the
essential elements of wrongful prosecution or emotional distress; (5) that there is no contract
between MID and Bliss upon which such a claim can be based; and (6) that there are no rights
that need be declared at this time. Lastly, MID seeks summary judgment on it claim for
declaratory relief and trespass, as alleged in its counterclaim, to have the encroachment created
by the plaintiff removed The motion for summary judgment is supported with the Affidavits
Blake Hall; Dan Davidson; Frank Hunt; Ruth Bailes; and Vance Johnson.
On April 7, 2018 Bliss filed his memorandum in opposition to summary judgment
together with Exhibits 1-20. The plaintiff’s opposition is not accompanied by any affidavits nor
are the plaintiff’s exhibits attached to any affidavits.
The Reply Brief of MID was filed April 16, 2018.

5 - MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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II.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) is appropriate only when
there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. When a court considers a motion for summary judgment, all facts are to be liberally
construed in favor of the nonmoving party, and the court must draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the party resisting the motion. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514,
517, 808 P.2d 851 (1991); Sanders v. Kuna Joint Sch. Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154
(Ct. App. 1994). “[T]he motion must be denied if evidence is such that conflicting inferences
may be drawn there from, and if reasonable people might reach different conclusions” unless the
trial court is to be the ultimate fact finder, in which case the court itself may resolve the
conflicting inferences. Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 720, 791 P.2d 1285 (1990).
However, a mere scintilla of evidence or only a slight doubt as to the facts is insufficient to
withstand summary judgment; there must be sufficient evidence upon which a jury could
reasonably return a verdict for the party opposing summary judgment. Corbridge v. Clark
Equip. Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87, 730 P.2d 1005 (1986); Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92
Idaho 865, 871, 452 P.2d 362 (1969). I.R.C.P. 56(e) requires that exhibits or other materials
offered in support of or opposition to a motion for summary judgment must be attached to the
party's affidavit verifying the items' authenticity. Puckett v. Oakfabco, Inc., 132 Idaho 816, 820,
979 P.2d 1174, 1178 (1998); Johnson v. City of Homedale, 118 Idaho 285, 288, 791 P.2d 162,
165 (Ct. App. 1990).
Further, our courts have repeatedly held that “issues considered on summary judgment
are those raised by the pleadings.” VanVooren v. Astin, 141 Idaho 440, 443, 111 P.3d 125
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(2005) (citing Beco Const. Co. v. City of Idaho Falls, 124 Idaho 859, 865, 865 P.2d 950 (1993)).
If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then only a question of law remains
and statutory interpretation is a question of law. Golub v. Kirk-Hughes Development, LLC, 158
Idaho 73, 75-76, 343 P.3d 1080, 1082-1083 (2015).
III.
JUDICIAL NOTICE
Pursuant to I.R.E. the Court hereby takes judicial notice of the pleadings and proceedings
in State v. Victor Rodger Bliss, Minidoka County Case No. CR-2016-2107 as follows:
1. A Criminal Complaint was filed July 28, 2016 for the offense of Wrongful Diversion
of Water, a misdemeanor, in violation of I.C. § 18-4304;
2. A Summons for the defendant was issued on July 28, 2016;
3. The defendant was served with the summons on August 2, 2016;
4. Counsel for the defendant made an appearance on August 3, 2016;
5. On August 3, 2016 the defendant filed an Appearance and Acknowledgement of
Rights;
6. On October 31, 2016 the prosecutor dismissed the complaint upon the payment of
restitution.
IV.
EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS
The plaintiff in his Statement of Disputed Material Facts has asserted a number of
evidentiary objections to the following Statement of Facts:
Statement of Fact Nos. 16 & 17– Plaintiff has asserted a hearsay objection pursuant to
I.R.E. 802;
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Statement of Fact No.18 – Plaintiff has asserted objections pursuant to I.R.E. 601, 602,
802 and 502.
The objections by the plaintiff are not supported with any cogent argument and for the
most part the employees and board members of the MID were testifying as to what they heard
the defendant say in regards to the removal of the lock, chain and wheel of the check structure
which led to the misdemeanor charge at issue in this case. The statements of the plaintiff are not
hearsay. Further, there is no dispute in the record that the plaintiff did in fact cut the chain and
lock on the check structure which is not in dispute. Therefore, the hearsay objection is overruled.
The plaintiff also asserts that the payment by the plaintiff of $75.00 is inadmissible
pursuant to I.R.E. 502. The plaintiff has presented no argument with respect to the attorney-client
privilege. There is no legal basis to conclude that such a payment is an attorney-client
communication. There is no dispute in the record based on judicial notice that the payment of the
$75.00 led to dismissal of the misdemeanor charge. Therefore, the I.R.E. 502 objection is
overruled.
V.
ANALYSIS
A.

Did Plaintiff fail to file a sufficient Notice of Tort Claim pursuant to Title 6,
Chapter 9 as to Counts II, III, & V?
The defendant argues that the defendant did not comply with the Idaho Tort Claims

Act in terms of the notice provided to the defendant as to some of his claims alleged in his
complaint. I.C. § 6-901, et seq. On February 28, 2017 the plaintiff through his counsel of
record sent a Notice of Tort Claim (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 11) to the Clerk/Secretary of the MID.
The letter in question notified MID that the plaintiff was submitting a tort claim for actions or
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omissions that occurred on or about June 30, 2016 which the plaintiff claimed caused
damages on or about September 20, 2016. The tort claim concerned alleged false statements
of MID employees or directors which resulted in the filing of criminal charges against the
plaintiff by the Minidoka County Prosecutor. The plaintiff claimed that the filing of criminal
of the criminal charges would not have occurred but for the false statements and as a result of
the filing of criminal charges the plaintiff claimed to have been defamed and that he
sustained damages to his reputation; he incurred attorney fees and costs for his defense; and
loss of income.
The defendant argues that the Notice of Tort Claim was deficient as to the causes of
action for breach of fiduciary duty; trespass; and wrongful prosecution/emotional distress as
alleged in Counts II, III & V of the complaint. The claim for breach of fiduciary duty is based
on the allegation of the plaintiff that MID has a fiduciary duty to operate and maintain its
canal and laterals so as to deliver irrigation water to its members which includes the duty to
control noxious weeds. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that the failure to control noxious
weeds within the canal/lateral and its right-of-way and the manner it operates and maintains
its canals has deprived Bliss of the water he is entitled to. He also seeks to be reimbursed for
the cost of spraying noxious weeds in 2015.1 The claim of trespass is based on the relocation
of a lateral and the alleged deposit of dirt from the canal outside of the right-of-way and upon
the fence of the Bliss property between 1998 and 2000.
Specifically, the defendant argues that the written claim dated February 28, 2017 did
not put MID adequately on notice of claims of breach of fiduciary duty, trespass, wrongful

1

The plaintiff has not provided any authority that the duty to maintain and operate the canal system is predicated
upon a fiduciary duty. The law is well settled that MID has a general duty to operate, maintain and repair its canal
system and the failure to do so with resulting damages is negligence. Pioneer Irr. Dist. v. City of Caldwell, 153
Idaho 593, 599, 288 P.3d 810, 816; Stephenson v. Pioneer Irr. Dist., 49 Idaho 189, 288 P. 421 (1930).
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prosecution or intentional infliction of emotional distress. There can be no dispute that all
such claims are torts as a matter of law. The claim of trespass is a tort against possession
committed when one, without permission, interferes with another's exclusive right to
possession of the property. See, Jaquith v. Stanger, 79 Idaho 49, 54, 310 P.2d 805, 808
(1957). A claim of breach of fiduciary duty sounds in tort akin to a claim of negligence.
Skinner v. U.S. Bank Home Mortg., 159 Idaho 642, 365 P.3d 398, 403 (2016). A claim for
malicious prosecution is a tort claim. Howard v. Felton, 85 Idaho 286, 379 P.2d 414 (1963).
A claim for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress is a tort claim. Gibson v.
Ada County, 142 Idaho 746, 133 P.3d 1211 (2005).
There is no dispute that claims against MID are subject to compliance with the Idaho
Tort Claims Act. Pursuant to I.C. § 6-906 a claim against a political subdivision [MID] must
be filed with the “clerk or secretary of the political subdivision within one hundred eighty
(180) days from the date the claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered,
whichever is later.” The content of a claim is governed by I.C. § 6-907, which provides in
relevant part as follows:
“All claims presented to and filed with a governmental entity shall accurately
describe the conduct and circumstances which brought about the injury or
damage, describe the injury or damage, state the time and place the injury or
damage occurred, state the names of all persons involved, if known, and shall
contain the amount of damages claimed, together with a statement of the actual
residence of the claimant at the time of presenting and filing the claim and for a
period of six (6) months immediately prior to the time the claim arose. …..”
In Turner v. City of Lapwai, 157 Idaho 659, 662, 339 P.3d 544, 547 92014) held that,
“No claim or action shall be allowed against a governmental entity ... unless the
claim has been presented and filed within the time limits prescribed by [the
ITCA].” I.C. § 6–908. See also Newlan v. State, 96 Idaho 711, 716, 535 P.2d
1348, 1353 (1975) (holding that “compliance with a notice of claim requirement
is mandatory and without such compliance a suit may not be maintained”). “The
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primary function of notice under the ITCA is to put the government entity on
notice that a claim against it is being prosecuted and thus apprise it of the need to
preserve evidence and perhaps prepare a defense.” Blass v. County of Twin Falls,
132 Idaho 451, 452–53, 974 P.2d 503, 504–05 (1999) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Smith v. City of Preston, 99 Idaho 618, 621, 586 P.2d 1062,
1065 (1978)). Notice also provides the parties an opportunity for an amicable
resolution of their differences. Farber v. State, 102 Idaho 398, 401, 630 P.2d 685,
688 (1981).
Both parties reference Cox v. City of Sandpoint, but as the Court in Turner noted, the Cox
decision only concerned the adequacy of the notice for purposes of section 6-907 and not to
whom the claim was sent pursuant to section 9-906. It is clear that the plaintiff in his notice of
tort claim was placing MID on notice that he was seeking damages relating to his misdemeanor
prosecution. The plaintiff alleged that the employees or board members of MID made false
statements which purportedly led to his prosecution and as such damaged his reputation. The
notice given in the tort claim was sufficient to encompass not only defamation but also wrongful
or malicious prosecution. There is no dispute that on July 28, 2018 the Minidoka County
Prosecutor charged the plaintiff with the misdemeanor offense of Wrongful Diversion of Water
in violation of I.C. § 18-4304. This notice is sufficient to put MID on notice of Count V of the
complaint. As to the alleged lack of sufficiency MID has not shown how they might have been
injured by the lack of additional notice or specificity as to the claim of wrongful prosecution.
Any claim that MID failed to property operate, maintain or repair its canals or laterals is a
tort claim. Pioneer Irr. Dist. v. City of Caldwell, 153 Idaho 593, 599, 288 P.3d 810, 816;
Stephenson v. Pioneer Irr. Dist., 49 Idaho 189, 288 P. 421 (1930). However, the notice at issue
does not allege that factual allegations set forth in the complaint as to the claims of breach of
fiduciary duty; trespass; or negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress. There is no
claim or assertion in the February 28, 2017 notice that Bliss was making any claim for trespass
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or any breach of any duty as concerns MID’s maintenance, operation or repair of its canal
system. The plaintiff never filed a tort claim with MID as to a claim of negligent maintenance of
the canals or laterals. Further, the plaintiff never filed a tort claim for trespass concerning any
dirt that MID might have deposited on the plaintiff’s property outside of the canal right of way
nor did he file a tort claim for emotional distress.
Any claim for trespass would necessarily have to be filed within 180 days of when MID
completed its work/project that caused the trespass between the period of 1998-2000. Farber v.
State, 102 Idaho 398, 630 P.2d 685 (1981). The plaintiff argues that the actions of MID may
constitute a “continuing tort”, however such a decision is unnecessary and moot since the
plaintiff has failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Idaho Tort Claim Act.
McQuillen v. City of Ammon, 113 Idaho 719, 747 P.2d 741 (1987); Farber v. State, 102 Idaho
398, 630 P.2d 685 (1981). The Court in Farber held that the notice period did not begin to run
when the project or damage began, but rather, when the construction project was completed. In
this case the deposit of the dirt on Bliss’s fence is alleged to have occurred between 1998 and
2000. That work was long completed and no claim was filed within the time required to file a
notice of tort claim.
The alleged failure to control the noxious weeds was in the year 2015 between May and
July of that year and yet no such claim was presented within 180 days as required by section 6906, Idaho Code. The compliance with the notice requirements of the Idaho Tort Claims Act is
mandatory and a condition precedent to the filings of a civil complaint. McQuillen v. City of
Ammon, 113 Idaho 719, 747 P.2d 741 (1987); Farber v. State, 102 Idaho 398, 630 P.2d 685
(1981).
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Therefore, summary judgment should be granted as to MID on the claims of trespass;
breach of fiduciary duty; and emotional distress for failure to comply with the notice
requirements of the Idaho Tort Claim Act.
B.

Has the plaintiff established a triable issue of fact to support a claim of Breach of
Fiduciary Duty?
Since the court has determined that the claim of breach of fiduciary duty should be

dismissed for failure to comply with the Idaho Tort Claims Act, further discussion is unnecessary
and moot. McQuillen v. City of Ammon, 113 Idaho 719, 747 P.2d 741 (1987); Farber v. State,
102 Idaho 398, 630 P.2d 685 (1981). However, it should be noted that plaintiff has presented no
authority that MID has breached any fiduciary duty based on the facts presented in this case. As
noted above MID has a general not fiduciary duty to operate, maintain and repair its canal
system.
“To establish a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, plaintiff must establish that defendants
owed plaintiff a fiduciary duty and that the fiduciary duty was breached.” Tolley v. THI Co., 140
Idaho 253, 261, 92 P.3d 503, 511 (2004). “Fiduciary relationships are commonly characterized
by one party placing property or authority in the hands of another, or being authorized to act on
behalf of the other.” Country Cove Dev., Inc. v. May, 143 Idaho 595, 603, 150 P.3d 288, 296
(2006). Our courts have recognized that directors of a corporation have fiduciary responsibilities
to both the corporation and its shareholders and it stands to reason that the corporate entity itself
would have similar duties as concerns its shareholders. Steelman v. Mallory, 110 Idaho 510, 716
P.2d 1282 (1986); Weatherby v. Weatherby Lumber Co., 94 Idaho 504, 492 P.2d 43 (1972).
To state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty a plaintiff must therefore allege and prove
that: (1) the defendant owed a fiduciary duty; (2) the defendant committed misconduct that
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breached the fiduciary duty; and (3) the plaintiff suffered damages proximately caused by such
misconduct. Evergreen West business Center, LLC v. Emmert, 296 P.3d 545 (Or. App. 2012);
Iacono v. Hicken, 265 P.3d 116 (Ut. App. 2011); Stanley v. Richmond, 35 Cal. App. 4th 1070
(Cal. App. 1995).
An irrigation district is a creature of statute. It has long been held by our courts that the
“ultimate purpose of a district’s organization, under the provisions of the statutes of this state, is
the improvement, by irrigation, of lands within the district. It is authorized to acquire the right to
use water for the purpose of delivery to settlers within the district….”. Yaden v. Gem Irrigation
Dist., 37 Idaho 300, 216 P. 250, 252 (1923). The irrigation rights are also constitutionally
preserved. Article XV, § 4 & § 5, Idaho Constitution.
An irrigation district which has obtained storage water rights is the appropriator of such
water and the irrigation district is entitled to “divert, impound, and control water from a natural
water course by means of a diversion structure…” and as such, the water “becomes the property
of the appropriator, [i.e. irrigation district] …impressed with the public trust to apply it to a
beneficial use”. In Re SRBA, supra.; Nelson v. Big Lost River Irr. Dist., 148 Idaho 157, 163, 219
P.3d 804, 810 (2009); Washington County Irrigation District v. Talboy, 55 Idaho 382, 385, 43
P.2d 943, 945 (1935).
There is no dispute that the defendant in this case holds in trust for the water users all of
the district’s water used for irrigation purposes. I.C. § 43-304 prescribes the powers and duties of
the Board of Directors of an irrigation district which in pertinent part provides:
“Said board shall have the power to manage and conduct the business and affairs
of the district, make and execute all necessary contracts, … to establish equitable
by-laws, rules and regulations for the distribution and use of water among the
owners of such land, as may be necessary and just to secure the just and proper
distribution of the same, …
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….
….The use of all water required for the irrigation of the lands of any district
formed under the provisions of this title, together with the rights of way for canal
and ditches, sites for reservoirs, ground water recharge projects and all other
property required in fully carrying out the provisions of this title, is hereby
declared to be a public use, subject to the regulation and control of the state, in the
manner prescribed by law.
The board of directors of an irrigation district organized under the laws of the
state of Idaho may enter into contracts for a water supply to be delivered to the
canals and works of the district, and do any and every lawful act necessary to be
done that sufficient water may be furnished to the lands in the district for
irrigation purposes.”
I.C. § 43-316 provides that legal title to all property acquired by the irrigation district under the
provisions of Title 43, is vested in the name of the irrigation district and “…shall be held by such
district in trust for, and is hereby dedicated and set apart to, the uses and purposes set forth [in
Title 43]. Said board is hereby authorized and empowered to hold, use, acquire, manage, occupy
and possess said property as herein provided.” The duties and responsibilities of the MID are
governed by Title 43, Chapter 3 as well as its by-laws, rules and regulations.
The plaintiff in support of its claim of breach of fiduciary duty relies on the following
argument in its brief at page 22 of 39:
“The district holds title to the water rights in trust for the landowners. The
landowners, to whose lands the water has become dedicated by application
thereon to a beneficial use, have acquired the status and rights of distributees
under Const., Art 15 §§ 4 and 5.” [Bradshaw v. Milner Low Lift Irr. Dist., 85
Idaho 528, 545 (1963)]
That, officials of a district would be in breach of trust if they use any district
water rights for the benefit of lands outside district boundaries. Yaden v. Gem
Irrigation Dist., 37 Idaho 300, 302 (1923).
The plaintiff is correct that if MID, which holds the water in trust for its members, were
to distribute such water to lands outside of the district without consent of its
members/landowners then they would have breached its trust or fiduciary duty. But that is not
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the issue in this case, as there is no allegation of claim that MID has delivered or distributed any
water to lands outside of the district boundaries. It may be true that MID may have certain
statutory duties to maintain it canals and laterals however there is no authority that every
statutory duty is the equivalent of a fiduciary duty. It has long been recognized that an irrigation
district is responsible in damages for negligent construction, maintenance or operation of its
canal system. Pioneer Irr. Dist. v. City of Caldwell, 153 Idaho 593, 599, 288 P.3d 810, 816;
Stephenson v. Pioneer Irr. Dist., 49 Idaho 189, 288 P. 421 (1930). A claim of negligence is not a
breach of a fiduciary duty.
The plaintiff has not identified any fiduciary duty that MID may have breached. At best
the plaintiff claims that MID has been negligent in the operation of its canal system but Bliss has
not pled such a claim. Therefore the motion for summary judgment should be granted as to the
claim of breach of fiduciary duty.
C.

If the notice of tort claim was sufficient, are some of the plaintiff’s claims barred
by the Statute of Limitations?
Since the Court has determined that the plaintiff failed to file a sufficient tort claim as to

the claims of trespass and breach of fiduciary duty the Court need not address the issue of the
statute of limitations.
D.

Has the plaintiff established a triable issue of fact as to the claim of trespass?
Since the plaintiff’s claim of trespass has been determined to be barred by failure to

comply with the Idaho Tort Claims Act any determination of the essential elements of a claim of
trespass is moot.
E.

Has the plaintiff established a triable issue of fact as to the claim of wrongful
prosecution?
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The defendant argues that the plaintiff has not established the material elements of a
claim of wrongful prosecution in that MID was not the “prosecutor” and that the defendant is
immune from such liability because the plaintiff has failed to present any proof of malice or
criminal intent, as required pursuant to I.C. § 6-904.
The Plaintiff must prove six elements in a malicious prosecution action: (1) that there was
a prosecution; (2) that it terminated in favor of the plaintiff; (3) that the defendant was the
prosecutor or that the defendant instigated the prosecution; (4) malice; (5) lack of probable
cause; and (6) damages. Shannahan v. Gigray, 131 Idaho 664, 667, 962 P.2d 1048, 1051 (1998);
Harrold v. Idaho State School for the Deaf and Blind, 112 Idaho 410, 732 P.2d 379 (Ct. App.
1987). MID argues that Bliss’ claim for malicious prosecution fails because MID was not “the
prosecutor. The Court in Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 765 P.2d 126 (1988) observed that a
claim of “malicious prosecution” arises out of a criminal action, and a claim of “wrongful civil
proceeding arises out of a “civil action”. Id. 115 Idaho at 102, 765 P.2d at 127, fn. 1. Our courts
have consistently referenced the Restatement 2d of Torts, §§ 653, et seq, which indicates that,
A private person who initiates or procures the institution of criminal proceedings against
another who is not guilty of the offense charged is subject to liability for malicious
prosecution if (a) he initiates or procures the proceedings without probable cause and
primarily for a purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice, and (b) the
proceedings have terminated in favor of the accused.
Restatement 2d of Torts, §§ 653 (emphasis added)
It is clear that as long as the defendant initiated or procured the criminal prosecution this satisfies
the element that the “defendant was the prosecutor”, however the record of the criminal
proceeding also reflects that the prosecution was terminated and the case was dismissed when the
plaintiff paid restitution in the sum of $75.00. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot show that the case
was necessarily dismissed in his favor since he did pay restitution to MID as a result of the
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prosecution. The plaintiff cannot show an essential element that the case was terminated in his
favor and summary judgment would therefore be appropriate as to the claim of wrongful
prosecution.
Also MID is immune from liability unless the plaintiff can prove the MID acted with,
malice or criminal intent. I.C. § 6-904.
The Idaho Tort Claims Act provides in relevant part that that,
A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course and scope
of their employment and without malice or criminal intent shall not be liable for
any claim which:
…..
(3) Arises out of …. malicious prosecution ….
…..
I.C. § 6-904(3).
The plaintiff in his unverified complaint alleges that MID reported false facts to the
County Sheriff seeking the plaintiff’s prosecution and that such false statements resulted in the
plaintiff’s prosecution and that the conduct and misrepresentations of the defendant were
intentional and reckless. First, on summary judgment the plaintiff may not rely upon the
unverified allegations of his pleadings. The plaintiff has the burden to present admissible
evidence to create a triable issue of fact.
The plaintiff has not sued the individuals involved in the alleged wrongful prosecution
and MID could only be liable if the individuals were acting in the course and scope of their
employment or agency. Assuming arguendo that the actions of the individuals were within the
course and scope of employment, MID is immune from liability unless the plaintiff presents
proof that the individuals acted with malice or criminal intent. There is a rebuttable presumption
that the employees/board members of MID did not act with malice or criminal intent. I.C. § 6-

18- MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Page 428

903(e); 6-904(3). The burden is on Bliss “to show some evidence” that the individuals employed
by MID “acted maliciously or with criminal intent.” I.C. § 6–903(e); Miller v. Idaho State
Patrol, 150 Idaho 856, 870, 252 P.3d 1274, 1288 (2011; Hunter v. State, 138 Idaho 44, 48, 57
P.3d 755, 759 (2002). The Court in Miller observed, “Malice here means ‘the intentional
commission of a wrongful or unlawful act, without legal justification or excuse and with ill will,
whether or not injury was intended.’” Beco Constr. Co. v. City of Idaho Falls, 124 Idaho 859,
864, 865 P.2d 950, 955 (1993) (quoting Anderson, 112 Idaho at 187–88, 731 P.2d at 182–83).
Criminal intent “is satisfied if it is shown that the defendant knowingly performed the proscribed
acts.” Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 470, 716 P.2d 1238, 1242 (1986) (quoting State v. Gowin,
97 Idaho 766, 767–68, 554 P.2d 944, 945–46 (1976))”. The plaintiff in part relies upon the
voluntary statement of Mr. Hunt [Exhibit 8] relative to the circumstances leading to the
misdemeanor charge however his statement does not show or evidence any malice or criminal
intent. The plaintiff has not presented any admissible evidence to rebut the presumption that
there was no malice or criminal intent based on the scant evidence in the record. Therefore the
motion for summary judgment on the claim of wrongful prosecution should be granted.
F.

Has the plaintiff established a triable issue of fact as to the claim of emotional
distress?
The plaintiff in Count V of his complaint alleges that the conduct of the defendant which

led to the filing of a misdemeanor complaint was “intentional or reckless” and “extreme and
outrageous” entitling his to damages for emotional distress. The defendant argues that the
plaintiff has not established the essential elements of such a claim as a matter of law. In Nation v.
State, Dept. of Correction, 144 Idaho 177, 192, 158 P.3d 953, 968, the Court stated:
Under Idaho law, a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress has four
elements: “(1) the conduct must be intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct must
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be extreme and outrageous; (3) there must be a causal connection between the
wrongful conduct and the emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress must
be severe.” Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Prods., 139 Idaho 172, 179, 75 P.3d
733, 740 (2003) (citing Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598, 601, 850 P.2d 749, 751
(1993)). As we have previously explained,
“[a]lthough a plaintiff may in fact have suffered extreme emotional
distress ... no damages are awarded in the absence of extreme and
outrageous conduct by a defendant.” Edmondson, 139 Idaho at 179, 75
P.3d at 740 (quoting Brown v. Fritz, 108 Idaho 357, 362, 699 P.2d 1371,
1376 (1985)). “Courts have required very extreme conduct before
awarding damages for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.”
Edmondson, 139 Idaho at 180, 75 P.3d at 741. “Even if a defendant's
conduct is unjustifiable, it does not necessarily rise to the level of
‘atrocious' and ‘beyond all possible bounds of decency’ that would cause
an average member of the community to believe it was ‘outrageous.’ ” Id.
(quoting Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 153 Ariz. 38, 43, 734 P.2d 580, 585 (1987)).
Estate of Becker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 527, 96 P.3d 623, 628 (2004). Whether
a defendant's conduct is so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery is a matter
of law. Edmondson, 139 Idaho at 180, 75 P.3d at 741.
Specifically, the defendant argues that the alleged conduct of the defendant does not rise
to the level that would be considered “atrocious” or “beyond all possible bounds of decency” and
that the plaintiff has presented no evidence of severe emotional distress. As noted above, such a
determination is for the trial court as a matter of law.
The plaintiff argues that “the pressure of getting sufficient water…while also facing MID
pursuing Bliss criminally resulted in severe emotional distress..”, but the plaintiff has presented
no evidence of such distress. The plaintiff goes on to refer to Bliss “being arrested” which is not
the case since he was summoned on the criminal complaint. Lastly the plaintiff argues that it is
outrageous that MID would pursue criminal charges when they had given Bliss permission to
open the “headgate”. What is clear from the evidence presented is that the plaintiff has not
presented any evidence that he has suffered “severe emotional distress”. Further, the conduct of
the defendant that the plaintiff complains about can be characterized as nothing more than
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negligence or a clear failure of the parties to communicate. The plaintiff asserts that Mr. Hunt
gave him authority to open a “the headgate”. There is no evidence that the plaintiff was given
authority to cut a lock and chain from the check structure in order to get the water he thought he
needed. The plaintiff’s reliance upon the voluntary statement of Frank Hunt [Exhibit 8] in
opposition to summary judgment clearly indicates the failure to communicate between the parties
and the statement does not reflect any malice on the part of Mr. Hunt. The plaintiff was charged
with a misdemeanor offense; the plaintiff was not arrested for that offense; the plaintiff did pay
restitution to the defendant and as a result the misdemeanor was dismissed. There is no evidence
in the record that the actions or conduct of MID was “atrocious” or “beyond all possible bounds
of decency”. Therefore, the motion for summary judgment should be granted as to the claim of
infliction of emotional distress.
G.

The plaintiff has failed to establish the existence of a contract with MID.
The defendant argues that there is no proof of a contract between MID and Bliss and as

such the breach of contract claim should be dismissed. Bliss argues that there is an implied
contract with MID for the delivery of water and the maintenance of the ditches. The plaintiff’s
complaint does not allege an “implied contract”. As noted above, the relationship between an
irrigation district and its members is governed by statute and the by-laws and regulations of the
irrigation district. Further, as to the allegations of the failure to deliver water or maintain ditches,
it has been long held that an action by a landowner within an irrigation district against the district
for damages for failure to supply water to which he was entitled is in tort, and not on contract.
The statutory relationship of the plaintiff and defendant does not give rise to an implied contract.
Snake River Valley Irr. Dist. v. Stevens, 18 Idaho 541, P. 1033 (1910). It stands to reason that if
an irrigator as a member of an irrigation district has failed to receive the water that he is entitled
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to grow his crops or if an irrigation district has failed to maintain its canals and ditches and the
irrigator is damaged then he can seek damages for negligence of the irrigation district and not in
contract. Therefore, the motion for summary judgment should be granted as to the claim of
breach of contract.
H.

Is there a justiciable controversy for a claim of declaratory relief?
Bliss in his complaint has asserted a claim of declaratory relief and he alleges that (1) “he

has a right to receive enough water delivered to him from MID to sufficiently water his crops”;
(2) that the water is deliverable pursuant to the times and schedules set forth by MID each water
season, similar to other similarly situated water users in MID”; (3) that “MID is required by law
to control noxious weeds upon and within its canals, ditches and surrounding banks where it
utilizes its easement”; and (4) that “MID is required to have all director meetings open to the
public at large, including Bliss”. The defendant argues that there is no justiciable controversy
upon which to grant the relief requested.
The Declaratory Judgment Act, I.C. § 10-1201, et seq. “…bestows the authority to
declare rights, statutes, or other legal relations” however, “…that authority is circumscribed by
the rule that ‘a declaratory judgment can only be rendered in a case where an actual or justiciable
controversy exists.”…” Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 772, 133 P.3d 1232, 1237 (2006)
(citing Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 516, 681 P.2d 988, 991 (1984)). The questions
concerning whether there is a “justiciable question” are divided into sub-categories consisting of:
“advisory opinions, feigned and collusive cases, standing, ripeness, mootness, political questions,
and administrative questions.” Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 639, 778 P.2d 757, 761
(1989). Therefore, an actual or justiciable controversy is still a prerequisite to a declaratory
judgment action; thus, courts are precluded “from deciding cases which are purely hypothetical
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or advisory.” Bettwieser v. N.Y. Irrigation Dist., 154 Idaho 317, 326, 297 P.3d 1134, 1143 (2013)
(quoting Wylie v. Idaho Transp. Bd., 151 Idaho 26, 31, 253 P.3d 700, 705 (2011)).
Idaho has adopted the constitutionally based federal justiciability standard. Davidson v.
Wright, 143 Idaho 616, 620, 151 P.3d 812, 816 (2006). Ripeness is that part of justiciability that
“asks whether there is any need for court action at the present time.” Id. (quoting Gibbons v.
Cenarrusa, 140 Idaho 316, 317, 92 P.3d 1063, 1064 (2002)). “The traditional ripeness doctrine
requires a … plaintiff to prove 1) that the case presents definite and concrete issues, 2) that a real
and substantial controversy exists, and 3) that there is a present need for adjudication.” Paddison
Scenic Props., Family Trust, L.C. v. Idaho Cnty., 153 Idaho 1, 4, 278 P.3d 403, 406 (2012)
(quoting Noh v. Cenarrusa, 137 Idaho 798, 801, 53 P.3d 1217, 1220 (2002)). To assert their
claims the plaintiffs must have “standing”. An allegation of speculative harm or injury “is not
sufficient to confer standing.” Coalition for Agriculture’s Future v. Canyon County, 160 Idaho
142, 369 P.3d 920 (2016) (citing, Martin v. Camas Cnty. Ex rel. Bd. Of Comm’rs., 150 Idaho
508, 514, 248 P.3d 1243, 1249 (2011). The Idaho Supreme Court on the issue of standing most
recently stated:
“It is a fundamental tenet of American Jurisprudence that a person wishing to
invoke a court’s jurisdiction must have standing.” Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens
for Term Limits, 135 Idaho 121, 124, 15 P.3d 1129, 1132 (2000). In order to
satisfy the requirement of standing, a petitioner must “allege or demonstrate an
injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will
prevent or redress the claimed injury.” Miles, 116 Idaho at 641, 778 P.2d at 763.
Standing requires a showing of a distinct palpable injury and fairly traceable
causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct. State v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 158 Idaho 874, 881, 354 P.3d 187, 194 (2015). “This Court
has defined palpable injury as an injury that is easily perceptible, manifest, or
readily visible.” Id. The injury cannot be “one suffered alike by all citizens in the
jurisdiction.” Troutner v. Kempthorne, 142 Idaho 389, 391, 128 P.3d 926, 928
(2006). There must be a fairly traceable causal connection between the claimed
injury and the challenged conduct. Id. “An interest, as a concerned citizen, in
seeing that the government abides by the law does not confer standing.” Id.
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Coalition for Agriculture’s Future v. Canyon County, 160 Idaho at 146, 369 P.3d at 924.
Bliss argues that he is not getting the water to grow his crops that he entitled to; that MID
has failed to carry out its duty to control noxious weeds; and that MID should hold open board
meetings.
There is some evidence in the record to suggest that Bliss at times may not have received
the water he is entitled at certain times but he has not alleged any actual injury nor has he
presented any evidence of any actual or threatened injury. The duties and responsibilities of the
MID as concerns the delivery and distribution of irrigation water is governed by Title 43,
Chapter 3 as well as its by-laws, rules and regulations adopted by MID. If Bliss has sustained
crop damages due to a lack of water he has a tort remedy available to him and there is no
showing of a justiciable controversy at this time.
As concerns the control of noxious weeds there is no need for declaratory relief since
both Bliss and MID have a statutory duty to control noxious weeds as set forth in Title 22,
Chapter 24. The powers and duties to as concerns the control of noxious weeds are vested in the
various counties of this State and the director of the Department of Agriculture. The legislature
has set forth the procedures for the enforcement of the control of noxious weeds. Therefore there
is no need for this court to declare the rights and obligations of the parties to this action when it
comes to the control and elimination of noxious weeds. Both the plaintiff and MID have a duty
to control noxious weeds on property that they have legal title to or have a right to exclude others
from possession and therefore there is no justiciable controversy as to the control of noxious
weeds. I.C. § 22-2402(13); I.C. § 22-2407.
Lastly, there is no evidence that MID does not hold open meetings or that Bliss has been
prevented from attending such meetings. Therefore there is no justiciable controversy as to the
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issue of open meetings of the MID board.
Therefore, the motion for summary judgment should be granted as to the claim of
declaratory relief.
I.

Is MID entitled to summary judgment on its counterclaim?
MID seeks to have the court grant summary judgment on its claims for trespass (Count I)

and declaratory judgment (Count II) based the construction and installation of a crossing into and
over Lateral 1712 by Bliss without the permission of MID. MID asserts that the crossing is an
encroachment of its right of way/easement and that the installation of the crossing is a trespass
and that the encroachment should be removed by Bliss.
As for Count I for claim of trespass, there is no dispute that Bliss holds title to the
servient estate as concerns the lateral and its right of way and that MID has the dominant estate.
Further, Idaho law has “long recognized that irrigation easements and rights-of-way are not
exclusive”. Pioneer Irrigation Dist. v. City of Caldwell, 153 Idaho 593, 601, 288 P.3d 810, 818
(2012). Under Idaho law, trespass is the “wrongful interference with the right of exclusive
possession of real property.” Moon v. N. Idaho Farmers Ass'n, 140 Idaho 536, 541, 96 P.3d 637,
642 (2004). Also see, Luce v. Marble, 142 Idaho 264, 274, 127 P.3d 167, 177 (2005). It is also
well settled that the servient estate (Bliss) is entitled to make use of his property provided that
such use does not “unreasonably interfere with (MID’s) enjoyment of its irrigation
easement/right-of-way. Id. Therefore, since MID does not have an exclusive right of possession
to its right-of-way and there has been no showing of an “unreasonable interference” with its
right-of-way, the motion for summary judgment on the claim of trespass should be denied.
In Count II of the Counterclaim seeks declaratory relief and MID seeks to have this Court
declare the crossing of lateral 1712 an encroachment of its easement/right-of-way. MID pursuant
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to I.C. § 42-1209 has the discretionary authority to allow or permit encroachments in its
easements or rights-of-way and such a decision to grant or deny and encroachment is “reviewed
to determine whether the decision making process was reasonable, the determination was
arbitrary and capricious, or the findings upon which the determination was reached were clearly
erroneous”. Pioneer Irrigation Dist. v. City of Caldwell, 153 Idaho at 599, 288 P.3d at 816. MID
seeks to have this court order Bliss to remove the “crossing” [encroachment] because he has not
signed a crossing agreement and he has not obtained the consent of the Bureau of Reclamation
(BOR). The removal of the alleged encroachment at this time does not require judicial
intervention. It is clear that MID does have the right of self-help to remove any encroachments of
its irrigation right-of-way that were constructed “without [its] permission and which [MID
determines to] unreasonably or materially interfere with the use and enjoyment of the easement
or right- of-way.” I.C. § 42-1209; Pioneer Irrigation Dist. v. City of Caldwell, 153 Idaho at 597601, 288 P.3d at 814-818. The record does not reflect that MID has made any determination or
conducted any hearings or proceedings to determine that the alleged encroachment
“unreasonably or materially interfere with the use and enjoyment of the easement or right- ofway.” It is undisputed in the record that Bliss did not have the written permission of MID to
construct the crossing over MID’s lateral and that Bliss did not comply with the requirements of
MID to obtain such written permission.2 MID has the right to exercise self-help to remove an
encroachment without judicial intervention. The Court in Pioneer Irrigation Dist., made clear
that there are four (4) conditions to be met in order for MID to exercise self-help to remove an
encroachment: (1) “the encroachment must have been constructed after the effective date of I.C.
§ 42-1209”; (2) “the encroachment must have been constructed without permission”; (3) “the
encroachment must unreasonably or materially interfere with the use and enjoyment of the
2

Bliss never signed the “crossing agreement” with MID or the Bureau of Reclamation (BOR)
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easement or right-of-way”; and (4) MID “must request that the party responsible for the
encroachment remove it.” Id. 153 Idaho at 599-600, 288 P.3d at 816-817.
It does not appear from the record and there has been no evidence presented by MID that
the crossing installed by Bliss “unreasonably or materially interferes with the use and enjoyment
of the easement or right-of-way” as concerns the subject lateral and it does not appear that MID
has exercised its discretion on that determination. If MID makes a determination that the
“crossing” “unreasonably or materially interferes with its easement or right-of-way, it can direct
Bliss to remove the “crossing” and if he fails to do so they can then incur the cost of such
removal and seek reimbursement of such cost from Bliss. If MID directs Bliss to remove the
“crossing” he can then seek judicial review of that decision. Pioneer Irrigation Dist. v. City of
Caldwell, supra. Since MID has the right of self-help and the procedure to exercise such selfhelp is set for the in Pioneer Irrigation Dist. v. City of Caldwell, supra., there is no need for
judicial intervention at this point and the motion for summary judgment should be denied on this
point and counterclaim should be dismissed and the matter remanded to MID for further
proceedings to be conducted relative the alleged encroachment..
VI.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the reasons set forth above, there are no triable issues of fact and as a matter of law:
(1) MID’s motion for summary judgment as to Counts I-V of the plaintiff’s complaint is
GRANTED and the plaintiff’s complaint is hereby Dismissed; (2) MID’s motion for summary
judgment as to its counterclaim is DENIED, and for the reasons set forth above the counterclaim
of MID is hereby Dismissed as to Count I-Trespass and remanded for further proceedings as to
Count II-Declaratory Relief relative to the alleged encroachment as to whether the crossing
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unreasonably and materially interferes with MID’s easement/right-of-way in accordance with
I.C. § 42-1209.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: 8/3/2018 04:07 PM
DATED: _________________________

__________________________________________
John K. Butler, District Judge

28- MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Page 438

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
document has been served as shown below on counsel of record (or self-represented party, if
Signed: 8/6/2018 04:34 PM
any) on _________________________:
Via Email
Jonathan R. Grover
Attorney for Plaintiff
jgrover@egb-law.com
Sam L. Angell
Attorney for Defendant
sla@hasattorneys.com

_______________________
Deputy Clerk
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Fifth Judicial District, Minidoka County
Tonya Page, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Sunderland, Janet

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA
VICTOR RODGER BLISS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MINIDOKA IRRIGATION DISTRICT,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2017-334

______________________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
______________________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
1. On the Plaintiff’s Complaint in favor of the defendant, Minidoka Irrigation District
and against the Plaintiff, Victor Rodger Bliss, and the Plaintiff’s Complaint is hereby
dismissed.
2. On the Defendant’s Counterclaim in favor of the Counter-defendant, Victor Rodger
Bliss and against the Counterclaimant, Minidoka Irrigation District as to Count I,
Trespass and the Counterclaim is dismissed as to Count I.
3. As to Count II of the Defendant’s Counterclaim for Declaratory Relief, the
Counterclaim is dismissed and the issue of the removal of the encroachment is
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remanded to the Minidoka Irrigation District for further proceedings in accordance
with I.C. § 42-1209.
Signed: 8/3/2018 04:07 PM
DATED: _________________________

__________________________________________
John K. Butler, District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
document has been served as shown below on counsel of record (or self-represented party, if
Signed: 8/6/2018 04:32 PM
any) on _________________________:
Via Email
Jonathan R. Grover
Attorney for Plaintiff
jgrover@egb-law.com
Sam L. Angell
Attorney for Defendant
sla@hasattorneys.com

_______________________
Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
51" JUDICIAL DISTRICT
MINIDOKA COUNTY, IDAHO
On 09/14/2018 4:50 PM
Tonya Page
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT
Filed By:.f-',1

Jonathan R. Grover (ISB 7318)
Attorney for Appellant
EVANS, GROVER & BEINS, P.C.
PO Box 160
Tremonton, Utah 84337
Tel: (435) 740-8800
Fax: (435) 740-8804
E-mail: JGrover@egb-law.com

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA

VICTOR RODGER BLISS,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

case No.: CV-2017-334

NOTICE OF APPEAL

vs.
MINIDOKA IRRIGATION DISTRICT,
Defendant/Respondent.

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT MINIDOKA IRRIGATION DISTRICT AND THE PARTY'S
ATTORNEYS, BLAKE G. HALL AND SAM L. ANGELL, 1075 S. Utah Avenue, Suite 150, Idaho Falls,
Idaho 83402 AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. The above named appellant Victor Roger Bliss appeals against the above named respondent to
the Idaho Supreme Court from the Judgment and Memorandum Decision Re: Motion for
Summary Judgment The order describing the Judgment was entered in the above entitled action
on the 611 day of August, 2018, the Honorable Judge John K Butler presiding. A copy of the
judgment or order being appealed is attached to this notice, as well as a copy of the final
judgment If this is an appeal from an order entered after final judgment
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments or orders
described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a)(1)
I.A.R.
□

This is an EXPEDITED APPEAL pursuant to I.A.R. 12.2.
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3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appeUant then intends to assert in the
appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellant from asserting
other Issues on appeal:
a. Whether the Trial Court erred by granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and
dismissing the Plaintiffs Complaint.
i. Whether to Trial Court erred in finding the Plaintiff failed to file a sufficient Notice

of Tort Claim pursuant to Title 6, Chapter 9 as to Counts II, Ill & V.
ii. Whether the Trial Court erred in finding that Plaintiff failed to establish a triable

issue of fact to support a claim of Breach of Fiduciary Duty.
iii. Whether the Trial Court erred in finding that Plaintiff failed to establish a triable
issue of fact as to the claim of wrongful prosecution.
iv. Whether the Trial Court erred in finding that Plaintiff failed to estabfish a triable
issue of fact as to the claim of emotional distress.
v. Whether the Trial Court erred in finding that the Plaintiff failed to establish the
existence of a contract with the Defendant
vi. Whether the Trial Court erred in finding that there is no justiciable controversy for
a claim of declaratory relief.
4. Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? NO.
If so, what portion? NIA

5. (a) Is a reporters transcript requested? Yes.
(b) The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions
of the reporters transcript in □ hard copy □ electronic format X both (check one): Oral Argument
Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment held April 23, 2018 beginning at 9:00 a.m.
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in addition to
those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.: Defendant's Motion for Summary

Judgment w/ exhibits; Plaintiff's Memorandum In Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment w/ exhibits 1-20; Affidavit of and Defendant's Reply Memorandum in
Support of Summary Judgment w/ exhibits.
7. Civil Cases Only. The appellate requests the following documents, charts, or pictures offered or
admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court.
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8. I certify:
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a transcript
has been requested as named below at the address set out below:
Name and address: Patty Hubbell, 1459 Overland Avenue, Burley, ID 83318
Name and address:._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Name and address:. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

(b)

(1) X That the clerk of the district court or administrative agency has been paid the

estimated fee for preparation of the reporte~s transcript.

(2) □ That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript fee because

(c)

(1) X That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's or agency's record has been

paid.
(2) □ That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the preparation of
the record because _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

(d)

(1) X That the appellate filing fee has been paid.
{2) □ That appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because

{e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to
Rule 20 (and the attorney general of Idaho pursuant to Section 67-1401(1), Idaho Code).
DATED THIS 14th day of September, 2018.
EVANS, GROVER & BEINS, P.C.:,?'
Jonathan R. rover
/ ·
Jonathan R. Grover, Attom~y for Appellant
/

/
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this 14th day of September, 2018, I served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL, along with a copy of this
Certificate of Service by the method indicated below, to the following:
Blake G. Hall
b,m@hasattorneys.com
Sam L. Angell
s)a@hasattorneys.com
HALL ANGELL & ASSOCIATES, LLP
1075 S. Utah Ave., Suite 150
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402

Email & U.S. Mail, First Class
Email & U.S. Mail, First Class

Patty Hubbell

U.S. Mail, First Class

Court Reporter
1459 Overland Avenue
Burley, ID 83318

Isl Jonathan R. Grover

Page 446

Filed: 08/06/2018 16:32:43
Fifth Judicial District, Minidoka County
Tonya Page, Clerk of the Court
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA
VICTOR RODGER BLISS,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.

)

Case No. CV-2017-334

)

MINIDOKA IRRIGATION DISTRICT,

____________
Defendant.

)
)
)

f

)

JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
I. On the Plaintiff's Complaint in favor of the defendant, Minidoka Irrigation District

and against the Plaintiff, Victor Rodger Bliss, and the Plaintiff's Complaint is hereby
dismissed.
2. On the Defendant's Counterclaim in favor of the Counter-defendant, Victor Rodger
Bliss and against the Counterclaimant, Minidoka Irrigation District as to Count I,
Trespass and the Counterclaim is dismissed as to Count I.
3. As to Count II of the Defendant's Counterclaim for Declaratory Relief, the
Counterclaim is dismissed and the issue of the removal of the encroachment is

i
!'

l
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\
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'

l

remanded to the Minidoka lrrigation District for further proceedings in accordance
with 1.C. § 42-1209.
_,.,_PM_ _ __
...
,_
13120
_ .._·8_
DATED: __....
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
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Jonathan R. Grover
Attorney for Plaintiff
jgrover@egb-law.com
Sam L. Angell
Attorney for Defendant
sla@hasattorneys.com
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~
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)

MINIDOKA IRRIGATION DISTRICT, )
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PROCEEDINGS

1

2

1

THE COURT: MID's motion. Mr. Angell.

2

MR. ANGELL: Thank you, Your Honor.
And this -- has the Court been able to

3

THE COURT: We'll take up Victor Bliss

3

4

versus Minidoka Irrigation District, CV-17-334.

4

receive briefing on this? I mean, there was a

5

Mr. Angell is here for the Defendant MID.

5

motion, a memorandum, a response, and we did file a

6

Are you Mr. Bliss?

6

reply to that.

7

MR. BLISS: Yes.

7

8

THE COURT: Defendant is here.

8

I still am not one hundred percent truthfully

9

And are you Mr. Grover?

9

confident in the Supreme Court's technology, we have

MR. GROVER: Yes, Your Honor.

10

THE COURT: Mr. Grover appearing for

11

THE COURT: Yes. And we've, again, because

10

gotten those, we've received them, reviewed them, and

11

printed them off, just in case.

12

Mr. Bliss. And we are set on a Motion For Summary

12

13

Judgment. And I believe we'll be back here on the

13

know we're implementing the new system and it makes

14

7th for two additional items. Is that correct?

14

me a little nervous. I just wanted to make sure the

MR. ANGELL: Yes.

15

stuff is getting through.

THE COURT: Any preliminary matters before

16

15
16
17

we take up the motion?

17

MR. ANGELL: That's one reason I asked, I

THE COURT: It is, and we've received the
briefing from both parties.

18

MR. ANGELL: No.

18

MR. ANGELL: Thank you, Your Honor.

19

MR. GROVER: No, Your Honor.

19

I'm sure the Court is aware that there are a

20

THE COURT: Mr. Bliss's motion. Mr. Grover.

20

number of issues that we've raised in this Motion For

21

MR. GROVER: No, I believe it's MID's

21

Summary Judgment. I'm going to address them by
count, and I just want to briefly touch on the
count.

22
23

motion, Your Honor.
MR. ANGELL: It's actually ours, yes.

22
23

24

THE COURT: I apologize.

24

25

MR. ANGELL: That's okay.

primary argument we've raised with regard to each
I know we've briefed it in detail, and I

25

4

3
1

don't want to get back into that much detail. And I

1

Title 42 or 43. And those titles, of course, deal --

2

don't know how the Court likes to handle this, but

2

regulate the delivery of water by an irrigation

3

I'm certainly -- I would prefer to address the issues

3

district.

4

that the Court has with this motion, so please feel

4

5

free to interrupt me at any time.

5

there simply isn't any caselaw that would support

THE COURT: Thank you.

6

that theory that the language of the code creates a

MR. ANGELL: I want to be able to answer

7

contract between Mr. Bliss and the irrigation

8

district.

6
7
8

those questions.
So, first, the plaintiff's Complaint alleges

9
10

five separate counts, and then we've made a

But as we've set forth in our briefing,

And just so the Court is aware, there are

9
10

different types of irrigation districts that have

11

counterclaim for declaratory relief, so I'm going to

11

different rules, and canal companies, and they handle

12

handle those in order. And I briefly want to touch

12

their business in different fashions. A canal

13

on the primary arguments with regard to those.

13

company might have various landowners who are

14

First, Count I is a breach of contract claim

14

shareholders in the canal company and that they have

15

that the plaintiffs have raised. There are a couple

15

written agreements with regard to a share. They get

16

of primary reasons that we believe this simply needs

16

X, Y, Z water delivered. It might cost them a fee

17

to be dismissed. First, there's simply no

17

per year, and there might be certain rules and

18

contractual arrangement between Mr. Bliss and the

18

regulations that go along with that.

19

Minidoka Irrigation District.

19

And he's conceded that, as far as I

20

20

That's not the way the irrigation districts
work. The Minidoka Irrigation District is,

21

understand it in his response brief, that there isn't

21

effectively, a taxing district that collects fees

22
23

a written contract or a verbal contract between the

from everyone who lives within the district, and then

irrigation district and Mr. Bliss. Instead, what he

22
23

they're entitled to water, sort of on an as-needed

24

tries to argue is that there is some sort of a duty

24

and as can be delivered basis. It's not a share

25

that creates a contractual-type relationship under

25

basis, and there's no written agreements with any of

5
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1

the parties.

1

any breach of fiduciary duty, which he has now tried

2

And I think that Mr. Bliss was either
confused about that or simply didn't plead that well,

2

to really construe and to acclaim for almost a
failure to deliver water under the breach of this

3

3

but as we've set forth in our briefing, there simply
is not a basis for a breach of contract claim in this

4

5
6

case.

6

dismissed because it wasn't involved in the tort

7

Second, Count II is a breach of fiduciary
duty claim that's been alleged against the Minidoka

7

claim.

4

8
9

5

Irrigation District. I've got to back up a step, now

duty that the Minidoka Irrigation District allegedly
had. And so, first, we believe that ought to be

Second, and we get into the nuts and bolts

8
9

of this in the briefing, but the statute simply

10

11

that I've gotten to the tort claims, and point out,
first of all, that under the Tort Claims Act, the

11

doesn't create a fiduciary duty on the part of the
irrigation district to deliver water. It outlines

12

plaintiff has to file a notice of tort claim, putting

12

the general parameters of what the irrigation

13

the Minidoka Irrigation District on notice of what
the tort claims are going to be.

13
14

district has to do when it's delivering water to the
taxpayers, but it doesn't create a fiduciary

15

relationship between the parties.

been characterized as a notice of tort claim. In it
there was only an allegation of defamation. And as

16

And does the Court have any questions about
that? I mean, that briefing really gets down the

we understood from that letter, it was an allegation
of defamation associated with the fact that Mr. Bliss

18

19

19

rabbit hole on what a fiduciary duty is.
THE COURT: No, the briefing is pretty clear

20

had a blowup. He cut the lock off a head gate. The

20

on that.

21

police were called, he was interviewed, he was cited,

21

22
23

and he believed that that caused him some sort of
harm to his character.

22
23

The next count is trespass. And, again,
I've got to get back to the Tort Claims Act.

24
25

And so the tort claim only put us on notice

24
25

Trespass was not included within the tort claim.

10

14
15
16
17
18

In this case, he did file a letter that has

of that defamation and it didn't put us on notice of

17

MR. ANGELL: Thank you.

There was no notice in the tort claim that the

7
1
2

8

plaintiff was going to raise a claim based upon dirt
being piled at the edge of his property and him

1
2

owns the ground, but under the statute, the canal
company -- or the irrigation district has a

3

4

arguing that that was a trespass.
When we got the Complaint, we saw that there

4

right-of-way, an easement to get in there and do
routine maintenance and to be able to maintain the

5

was a count for trespass. If you look at the

5

lateral.

6

Complaint and the language that is used in the
Complaint -- and it's important for the Court to get

6

And if that requires building up the bank a
little bit or altering its course to make sure that

back to the Complaint when looking at these claims -in the Complaint, Mr. Bliss alleges that there was

8

some alteration along a canal and that dirt was
placed across his boundary line and onto his property

10

and that that constituted a trespass.
Through the course of discovery -- and we've

12

included this in our affidavits -- it's been
determined that, yes, the lateral was altered. It

14

was -- the angle was changed a little bit, back in
about 1998, and some dirt was piled up alongside of

16

17
18

the canal.

18

3

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

19

It does sit on Mr. Bliss's property -- well,

21

Mr. Bliss would have been required, if he believed
that dirt or that canal bank was trespassing on his

13

17

20
21

property, to bring that within two years. And so the
statute of limitations has also run on that.
Getting back to the dirt issue, Mr. Bliss

11

19

hang onto that thought for just a second -- but

25

9

15

20
22
23
24

7

it functions properly, that's within the irrigation
district's right to be able to do that.
And the dirt, we believe, that Mr. Bliss
claims is on his property really sits within the
right-of-way anyway. There's a 16-foot easement on
either side of that to be able to do maintenance, and
that's within the area of where this dirt sits. So
we believe there simply isn't a factual basis for a
trespass on that, even if it had been properly
alleged.
With regard to the -- in response to the
Motion For Summary Judgment, and arguing the
trespass, the plaintiff has tried to creep another
issue in with the trespass, and it's really just been
raised for the first time in summary judgment, and

22
23
24

this is a water issue.
He's claiming that some water got outside of

25

the lateral. I have to explain that to you a little
10

9
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1

bit. Mr. Bliss is approximately the second to the

1

adequate water for his crops, to declare the

2

last landowner on the lateral. As the water comes to

2

requirements for water delivery, to declare that

3

the end of the lateral, during the watering season,

3

Minidoka Irrigation District has to control noxious

4

they have a plug in at the end, a dirt plug, that

4

weeds, and to declare that the director meeting

5

will sort of stop the water so it can be used for

5

should be opened to the public.

6

irrigation.

6

We believe that factually there just isn't a

7

At the end of the year, that's typically

7

basis for the Court to have to go there. I mean, the

8

taken out to allow it -- for the water to kind of

8

meetings, there's no question that the meetings, for

9

drain into a low area. If I understand him right,

10

9

what Mr. Bliss is alleging is that that plug was not

10

11

removed or placed properly, so that some water was

11

12

able to seep onto his property.

12

If that is the claim he intended to allege

example, are open to the public. Mr. Bliss has been
to a number of them.
And then the rest of the things that he's
asking the Court to declare are items that are

13

covered under the statute anyway. The statute sets

14

for trespass, he certainly didn't get it in the

14

forth the general duties and responsibilities of the

15

Complaint and it wasn't in the notice of tort claim,

15

irrigation district, and it covers all of these

16

and so it's improper to be raising that for the first

16

things.

17

time at summary judgment when we haven't had any

17

18

opportunity to address that or do any discovery on

18

tenant have been allowed to have access to water for

19

that issue.

19

the crops. There's no question that the irrigation

20

district is acting reasonably or attempting to

21

deliver the water to its users.

13

The next claim in the Complaint, Count IV,

20

There's no question that Mr. Bliss and his

21

is for declaratory relief. In it, the plaintiff

22
23

makes various allegations, and if you look at page 30

22
of our Motion For Summary Judgment memo, we kind of 23

with how that's happening, but I don't think that

24
25

outline what it is he's asking for. He effectively

requires the Court to make these general declarations

24
25

asks the Court to declare that he has access to

Now there may be -- Mr. Bliss has his issues

that he's entitled to those rights.

11

12

Finally, on Count V, Count V is a wrongful

1

There is still, under Idaho law, a way where

1

2

prosecution claim. There isn't technically a tort

2

you can allege that the reporting party acted with

3

for wrongful prosecution in Idaho. We've interpreted

3

malice, but you've got to show that they fabricated

4

that to be a claim for malicious prosecution;

4

police reports, they did it with the intention of

5

however, under -- again, this is back to the tort

5

injuring the other person, and that there was no

6

claim -- this was not included in the original tort

6

probable cause for the charge, for the ultimate

7

claim.

7

charge.

Second, when you look at the language the

8
9
10

In addition, those things are all sort of

8

plaintiffs used in their Complaint, it appears as

9

though what Mr. Bliss is arguing here is a malicious

cut off if there's an independent decision made by

10

either the prosecutor or the police agency to file

11

prosecution related to the fact that he was reported

11

the charges. And in this case, and the Court can

12

to the police associated with cutting the lock off

12

look at the facts, there was evidence of probable

13

the head gate.

13

cause to support a claim that Mr. Bliss had injured

14

this property because Mr. Bliss was heard by two

specific immunity for government entities for claims

Idaho Tort Claims Act 6-904 provides a

15

representatives of the irrigation district of saying,

16

of malicious prosecution. We're just immune from

16

"Hell, yeah, I cut that off, and you're not getting

17

those claims, unless, as it says in the statute, the

17

it back."

18

plaintiff can prove that the government entity acted

18

When they heard that, they recorded it.

19

with malice and with the lack of probable cause.

19

We've produced the recording through discovery. They

20

went and made a report to the police and turned it

14
15

Now because we're not a police agency, you

20
21

typically see these claims alleged against the

21

over to the police and the prosecutor to make the

22
23
24

sheriff or against the prosecuting attorney. Where

charge that they felt like was appropriate with that.

charges for crimes, what our people did is simply

22
23
24

their rights to do that as citizens, as an irrigation

25

made a report to the police.

25

district. And, second, they're within that immunity

we're an irrigation district and we don't file

And in doing that, they are certainly within

13
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1

under 6-904, that they're immune from any claim

1

2

associated with that, unless the plaintiffs can show

2

3

malice or a lack of probable cause, neither of which

3

4

they can show.

4

number of these torts, including breach of contract,

5

or excuse me, breach of fiduciary duty, trespass, and

I want to touch on a -- I've worked through

5

have.
Second, that gets to really the causation on
the damages. Mr. Bliss hasn't alleged damages on a

6

the counts and the primary arguments. There's a

6

wrongful prosecution. He hasn't been able to make

7

couple of other defenses that I want to touch on

7

the connection on the damages, which is an element of

8

briefly. First -- and I've got to back up to the

8

the claim that he has to show to be able to survive

9

facts just a little bit -- Mr. Bliss leases this farm

9

summary judgment.

10

out to tenants. In 2013, he signed a five-year lease

11

with the tenants.
The tenants are really the individuals who

12

So I would just like to direct the Court

10
11

back to the summary judgment standards. It's

12

important that the plaintiff has to demonstrate that

13

have the ability to raise a number of these claims

13

there is a genuine issue of fact on each of the

14

Mr. Bliss is trying to raise. Mr. Bliss doesn't have

14

required elements of his claims. He's failed to do

15

any crop loss because he's leased his farm out. He

15

that in this case for the reasons that we've

16

conceded in his deposition he's been paid fully under

16

described in our briefing, and we believe that each

17

the lease.

17

one of his counts should be dismissed.

18

And in various depositions, it has been

18

19

indicated that when the tenants need water, they have

19

20

no problem contacting the irrigation district and

20

Relief. There is a Motion For Declaratory Relief

21

working that out with the ditch riders. And so many

21

related to a trespass that Mr. Bliss has created

22
23

of the allegations that Mr. Bliss is making, he's

22
23

under Idaho Code 42-1102. We've cited this in our

24
25

or controversy. He isn't the one actually farming

24
25

encroachment across the lateral owned by the

precluded from making because he doesn't have a case
the ground. So that's an affirmative defense that we

And a final point, we have moved for partial
summary judgment on our Motion For Declaratory

briefing, that the landowners cannot build an
irrigation district without permission.

16

15

Mr. Bliss has conceded in his deposition

1

1

and sign it. But he built the encroachment. It's

2

that he built a bridge. He built an encroachment

2

still there. The water flows under it, but it's

3

over the lateral, did not get permission ahead of

3

technically an encroachment across the lateral.

4

time to do that, and that encroachment remains today,

4

5

so we're requesting the Court issue an order

5

to manage, maintain, do those sorts of things if

6

declaring Mr. Bliss needs to remove that

6

landowners are going to go out and build their own

7

encroachment.

7

crossings on encroachments without letting us know

8

ahead of time and making sure it's done in an

9

appropriate fashion.

And that's the summary of our arguments,

8
9

Your Honor. Do you have any questions?
THE COURT: I guess, just that very last

10

And it does affect our ability a little bit

THE COURT: Thank you for that. Back to one

10

11

point. Is it, the encroachment as it stands today,

11

of the near, one of the last points, the discussion

12

is it prohibiting any delivery of water?

12

about I understand that he leases the property out.

MR. ANGELL: That's a difficult question to

13

Maybe talk to me a little bit about, is it

13

14

answer. It shouldn't be. The water flows under

14

the contention that he couldn't bring some of these

15

it --

15

actions because it's being leased or is it because

16

THE COURT: I understand.

16

the damages don't flow to him, where it really is

17

MR. ANGELL: -- but there are two things at

17

talking about the people who are leasing the

18

play here. First, we have some federal government

18

property?

19

regulations that we have to comply with. And the

19

20

federal government requires us to get a form signed

20

may not have worded that well, but he has to prove

21

each element of his claim. So, for example, if he

21

before anybody builds an encroachment across water

22
23
24

that's being delivered that's coming off of

25

signing a paper, but he's been unwilling to come in

22
federally-managed water, so we have that requirement. 23
And, literally, it's as simple as Mr. Bliss
24

MR. ANGELL: That's how it arises. And I

wants to claim on the breach of fiduciary duty, he's
arguing that he's not getting water delivered and
that it's affecting him.

25
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1

the crops being grown and damages associated with

1

responsible for the deliverance of that water, for

2

that. Mr. Bliss can't raise those arguments because

2

the maintenance of those easements and canal ways.

3

he's not the one farming the ground, growing the

3

And not only is that specified in the

4

crops, suffering the damage. He has been paid

4

agreements that the Bureau has with MID, but it's

5

everything that's due to him under the agreement with

5

also specified under Idaho law. And so we fast

6

his tenant, and so the cutoff is with the causation

6

forward to the current situation here, and the

7

and damages elements.

7

original canal that came through or that serviced my

8

client's property was relocated back in about the

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you,

8
9

very much.

9

late '90s, and there was another relocation done on

MR. ANGELL: Thanks. Appreciate it, Your

10

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Grover.

12

this property of my client is still located in the

13

MR. GROVER: Thank you, Your Honor.

13

same spot, but the canal that services my client's

14

I think it may be helpful just to help the

14

property, before it gets to his property, has been

10
11

Honor.

12

an appurtenant piece of property after that.
And so the natural canal that came through

11

15

Court with some basic background information of how

15

relocated. The canal that services -- that takes the

16

these claims come about.

16

runoff water away from my client's property has been

17

relocated.

Initially, when MID was formed a long time

17
18

ago, back in the '20s or so, there were contracts

18

19

entered into between MID and the Bureau. And the

19

time is that it's changed the flow of the water on my

20

Bureau essentially assigned MID the right to take

20

client's property because now we have different

21

care of these laterals and the right to take --

21

elevations. We have different places where the water

22
23

deliver water to the landowners in the area.

22
23

is coming from and where the water is draining, how

24
25

place that placed duties upon MID and other

It was then statutory enactments were put in

24
25

irrigation districts so that they would be

And so what has happened over the course of

the water is draining off of his property.
And so essentially what that has done is
created a place where my client's head gate is

19

20

1

located that he cannot get adequate water out of. I

2

mean, that's the bottom line here.
And so those enactments of changing the

3

1

continues because the dirt is still there today.

2

There is testimony, and there's evidence from Wes

3

Scott, from my client, from Dan Davidson, all of them

4

canal structure the way that it's been done by MID

4

that testified that said these fence posts are

5

has greatly affected him while it's only benefiting

5

covered up. And because of that, that dirt has come

6

the surrounding landowners in the case.

6

right onto his property in a place where the canal is

7

not located on his property.

And so with that understanding, that

7
8
9
10

background understanding here, when MID did go ahead
and change the canal, what they did is they located

9

the lateral on a corner piece of property located

So that's the basic gist of it. So if I can

8

just kind of go through, with that background, with

10

that understanding, each of our arguments with
regards to the issue on summary judgment.

11

next to Mr. Bliss. And this corner piece takes a

11

12

direct 90-degree angle before it comes onto

12

First, there is an argument here that

13

Mr. Bliss's property.

13

Mr. Bliss has not complied with the Idaho Torts Claim

14

Act. Now I've filed with the Court Mr. Bliss's

are located mostly upon this abutting piece of

And so even though the canal and its banks

15

letters that are attached as Exhibit No. 12, I

16

property, the canal bank is now sloughed off and

16

believe, to our memorandum. And there are extensive

17

they've piled excess dirt on top of the canal bank,

17

letters. There's not just one claim letter that was

18

so it floods over onto Mr. Bliss's property.

18

sent. There's multiple letters.

14
15

19

And so it's not an issue of the canal

19

There's an invoice that Mr. Bliss himself

20

easement itself being located on Mr. Bliss's property

20

prepared for some spraying costs and charges.

21

because this area of property was changed by MID.

21

There's multiple letters between my office,

22
23
24

This is not an original area that the canal sat in.

22
23
24

Mr. Fletcher's office, describing the extent of the
damages and describing the violations of law with

25

And it's a continuing trespass issue. It

25

of fiduciary duty claim, not cleaning up the

And so because of that, that's where the trespass
issue comes in at.

regards to the trespass claim, with regards to breach

21
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1

easement, allowing water to flood onto my client's

1

2

property, and trying to address these matters at

2

standpoint, is the fact that Mr. Hunt was out there

3

length.

3

on my client's property the very same day. He was

4

out there. He viewed the ditch. He viewed the water

5

four or five different times, there is a final letter

5

level. He viewed the irrigation head gate. He

6

that I in fact sent that addressed this -- what

6

viewed the undertow and the overtow currents. He

7

counsel has classified as a defamation action.

7

knew the situation.

4

And then, finally, after we did that, about

And even more egregious, from our

8

Just because a choice of wording at the time

9

says "defamation" does not control the fact that MID

10

was given notice of what the claim is about. That

8

And then when my client calls him up that

9

evening to say, "Listen, I can't get any water. I'm

10

not going to have sufficient water." And he tells

11

notice specifically described the statements that

11

him, "Sounds like you need more water." How else is

12

were given by each one of MID's employees, and the

12

he supposed to take that, other than I need to go do

13

fact that the statements themselves that were

13

it myself because no one else is going to do it for

14

provided to the county sheriff's office were false.

14

me.

15

And the reason they were false is because

And so the issue here isn't that he cut the

15

16

the statement says that my client did not have

16

lock off. The issue is that he had the authority to

17

authority to take the water, when Mr. Hunt, who is

17

get the water. That's the misrepresentation issue

18

the president of the board of directors, specifically

18

and that's what was represented to the county

19

says that he did give my client such authority.

19

attorney's office, and that is why there was

20

prosecution leveled against my client.

20

And so for the rest of the employees to sit

21

there and say, we're going to make up these false

21

22
23

statements for the purpose of going ahead and

22
23

24
25

to prosecute Mr. Bliss, that's where this malicious

prosecuting or enticing the county attorney's office

24
25

prosecution claim comes from.

And so in addressing each one of those
issues on the prosecution, that is maliciousness,
that is a lack of probable cause when you have Frank
Hunt, who is chairman of the board at the time,
giving my client authority to get water, and now you

23

24

1

have several other people who wrote statements that

2

my client doesn't have that authority; contradictory.

2

3

Let me go back up to the breach of contract

3

provided to the Court about the breach of those

1

duties.
Now there's extensive evidence that we've

4

action. With regards to breach of contract, the

4

duties, about the failure to maintain the canal

5

Idaho Constitution has specifically stated and

5

system, the failure to spray the weeds, the failure

6

reserved districts, water districts, to have

6

to control the head gate system in the overflow and

7

fiduciary duties that they owe to their people they

7

the undertow currents and things like that that

8

distribute water to.

8

affect the water that's delivered to my client.

9
10

And it says that in the terms that that

And so because of those failures, and

9

district holds the water in trust, and specifically

10

there's definitely a disputed fact there, but because

11

in trust. Now my understanding of basic trust law is

11

of those, summary judgment is inappropriate on that

12

that it requires a trustor, it requires a trustee, it

12

issue.

13

requires a beneficiary, and I don't think that's

13

14

changed much.

14

counsel for MID points out that, once again, there's

15

no notice under the tort claim. I would point the

15

And so in this type of situation, when you

Next, with regards to the trespass claim,

16

have a trustee, such as MID, who is holding that

16

Court again to Exhibit No. 12. There are multiple

17

water for the benefit of my client, then what happens

17

communications going back and forth, discussing these

18

is they owe to him certain fiduciary responsibilities

18

issues in length and in detail between the parties.

19

by common law, by statutory law, whatever you want to 19

We believe that the trespass claim is fully

20

call it, there's different avenues of duty that they

21

owe to my client.

20

satisfied, the notice element is fully satisfied, by

21

Exhibit No. 12. There is no specific formula, I
guess I should say, or form, that a person has to

because of that, they have to provide him certain

22
23
24

obligations to make sure that they fulfill their

25

It's not just based upon a statutory scheme.

22
23
24

It's based upon common law trust as well. And so

25

provide to give notice under the Idaho Torts Claim
Act.
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1

concedes that. And so our position is that we didn't

1

those declaratory relief things are itemized right in

2

need to follow anything specific. We just need to

2

the Complaint that was filed.

3

give them sufficient notice. There is a statute that

3

There's an argument that this is not a

4

does require that you provide the parties who were at

4

justiciable claim, and that's just simply not the

5

issue there, that you provide some description of

5

case here because these are rights that are directly

6

what happened and what your damages were.

6

affected by Mr. Bliss.

7
8
9
10

And if the Court reviews those letters, they

7

He has the right to receive this water.

do describe that, and the amounts are in there, the

8

This water, once again, is being held in trust by MID

people affected are in there, and there's just no

9

because it's appurtenant to his property. It goes

issue that that notice was given in our mind.

10

with his property. And so because of that, they have

11

And so we do believe that because it is a

11

certain duties, they have certain obligations that

12

continuing trespass, because it's something that's

12

they owe.

13

being affected every single day, that this isn't a

13

14

statute of limitations issue, and my client is

14

deposition transcripts that we've submitted to the

15

entitled to bring that cause of action until it's

15

Court, and given the extensive pictures and letters

16

cured under each one of those theories.

17

Now addressing the declaratory relief, one

And there's no doubt in our mind, given the

16

that have gone back and forth, that there is a

17

triable issue here of fact relating to whether those
duties were in fact breached.

18

of the arguments that was raised for the first time

18

19

by MID in its reply brief are other avenues that my

19

20

client may have to pursue, types of degradation from

20

heard from MID on this issue relate to whether or not

21

MID.

21

those duties even exist, even though initially, in

22
23

the memorandum supporting summary judgment, there was

22
23
24
25

We don't dispute that there are other
avenues that he can seek, but what we're asking the

24
25

Court to do is to declare his rights that he has with
his water. That's essentially it in a nutshell. And

And most of the arguments that the Court has

some argument about whether they were breached.
Now the focus seems to shift to whether
those duties actually exist. And I believe that if

28

27

1

the Court looks at the constitution itself, saying

2

that this water is being held in trust, if the Court

2

MID owed these duties. There is sufficient facts

3

looks at the agreements between the parties,

3

that have been put before the Court to show those

4

particularly what was the duty, what was implied in

4

duties were breached, and we're asking the Court to

5

the fact, what was implied in the law, that made the

5

deny the Motion For Summary Judgment.

6

contractual obligation between MID and Mr. Bliss, and

6

7

that is that MID was to deliver water to Mr. Bliss.

7

8

1

That's been the same type of situation for

to the Court, there is sufficient law in place that

Any questions that the Court has for me at
this time?
THE COURT: I don't think so.

8

9

the last 100 years or so, that he has been the

9

I appreciate the briefing and the documents

10

recipient of that water. And so, as such, that

10

submitted. It helped make the case much clearer. I
won't say clear, but clearer.

11

becomes now the obligation that MID has, because of

11

12

the statutory creature that it is, the district that

12

So, Mr. Angell.

13

it is. And so it's not just a creature of statute,

13

MR. ANGELL: Thank you, Your Honor.

14

it is also a creature of fact in this case, and

14

15

that's where that contract, that implied contract

15

16

comes into play between the two of them.

16

17

17

So there are alternative, I guess, claims

I just want to respond to two points that
counsel made. I'll try to be brief.
First, and this one is important, under the
Tort Claims Act issue, Mr. Grover did submit various

18

for relief here, is what I'm trying to tell the

18

letters to the Court as Exhibit No. 12. There is --

19

Court, argue to the Court. It's not just this way or

19

we've addressed that on page 7 of our reply brief.

20

the highway. There are alternative ways to look at

20

The key issue with that is this: The Tort

21

this case; breach of contract, breach of fiduciary

21

Claims Act is very clear that in order for it to be a

22
23
24

duty, trespass, declaratory relief, and malicious

22
23
24

tort claim, you've got to file it with the clerk of

25

Court that, based upon the facts that we've submitted

25

the attorney for the Minidoka Irrigation District, or

prosecution.
And so because of that, we're asking the

the entity. The letters that were submitted back and
forth are between Mr. Grover and Mr. Fletcher, who is

29
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1

they're an invoice between Mr. Bliss that he sent

2

over to Mr. Fletcher of the irrigation district.

3

And so the letters between counsel do not

Mr. Grover addressed it to the Minidoka

1
2

Irrigation District, attention Ruth Bailes, who is

3

the clerk secretary, and it was sent first class

4

qualify as a notice of tort claim, and that is

4

certified and signed. It has the elements, or

5

important.

5

purports to have the sections that the statute

6

requires. It's supposed to describe the conduct and

7

I apologize, I hate to interrupt counsel during

7

circumstances, the time and the place, the

8

argument, but that is a misstatement of fact with

8

individuals involved, and the injury or damage that's

9

regards to the letter that Mr. Bliss sent over to

9

alleged.

6

MR. GROVER: Your Honor, I need to object.

10

Mr. Fletcher. Mr. Bliss sent that directly to Ruth

11

Bailes at the district.

12

Mr. Bliss, through his attorney, knew how to

10

MR. ANGELL: If I'm mistaken on that, the

11

file a notice of tort claim, and they did it in

12

February of 2017. They're trying to go back now and

13

record -- I may be mistaken on that. I want to make

13

create a second or expand the notice of tort claim or

14

sure I'm clear.

14

create a second one, through these letters that have

15

THE COURT: We're going to take this under

15

gone back and forth. That statute prohibits that.

16

advisement, so we will spend quite a bit of time, and

16

It doesn't give the government entity a chance to

17

we'll make sure that's clear.

17

review those claims.

18

Go ahead, Mr. Angell.

18

19

MR. ANGELL: Sure. Certainly the letters

19

The second point that I want to address, and
that's on the malicious prosecution claim. Counsel

20

between Mr. Grover and Mr. Fletcher do not qualify as

20

has made an argument that he believes that the malice

21

a notice of tort claim. When he got around to filing

21

was in that the statements given to the police

22
23

the notice of tort claim, which is -- I want to make

22
23

implied that Mr. Bliss did not have the authority to

24
25

hold me to the fire here -- he served that notice of

sure I'm getting this right so Mr. Grover doesn't

24
25

tort claim on February 28th, 2017.

open or close the head gate.
A couple things I just want to describe it
to the Court so we make sure we're clear.

31
1

32

Mr. Bliss's head gate, if the water is running this

1

everybody downstream, and he cut a lock to do that.

2

direction, Mr. Bliss's head gate sits here, right

2

3

above a diversion, a check point in the lateral.

3

that he should do, and it didn't give him authority

4

to do it himself. He just said, "It sounds like you

5

check point in the lateral that is downstream from

5

need more water. You're a water user. You know what

6

his head gate, he cut the lock off of that and he

6

to do; call them up and tell them to turn more water

7

raised it up or adjusted it in some fashion to stop

7

down the ditch."

8

more water, raise the water level, and send it down

8

9

his ditch through his head gate.

4

10

And so what Mr. Bliss did is he used the

If he would have done what Mr. Hunt implied

9

And he wants to say that he had authority to

He would have called and they would have
turned more water down the lateral so it would have

10

raised the level for his head gate. So to suggest

11

do that because he talked to Mr. Hunt, who was a

11

that that gave him authority to go out and cut a lock

12

commissioner. What Mr. Hunt told him and explained

12

is really outside of the facts, and it certainly

13

in his deposition is that Mr. Bliss called to him

13

doesn't create a situation where the statements that

14

complaining, complaining about not getting water and

14

were made by our individuals to the police were with

15

dah, dah, dah, dah. Mr. Hunt's quote was, "It

15

malice or that they lacked probable cause.

16

sounded like he needed more water in the ditch."

16

17

Needing more water in the ditch means you

17

THE COURT: At that time, Mr. Hunt was a
board member of MID board, correct?

18

call the irrigation district and ask them to come

18

19

upstream and turn more water down the ditch so that

19

the Court to dismiss their claims. Thank you, Your

MR. ANGELL: Yes. So, again, we would ask

20

it raises the level in the ditch and the lateral and

20

Honor.

21

allows you to get water in the head gate.

THE COURT: I appreciate both parties, the

21

There's two ways to raise the lateral; you

briefing, the documents I received, and the

point below you. In cutting off the check point

22
23
24

below him, what he did is he cut off all the water to

25

Hopefully, that's not a surprise to either party.

22
23
24

turn more water down the lateral or raise the check

25

preparation, the obvious preparation for today.
I am going to take this under advisement.

33
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There's still some of the depositions that I need to
review and some other documents. So we'll take it
under advisement.
We'll try to get an opinion out as quick as
we can. I don't have access right now to our trial
calendar, but when are we currently set for trial?
MR. ANGELL: Your Honor, I believe it's set
on June 5th or 6th, in that range, for trial.
THE COURT: All right. We will do our best
to maybe even get that opinion out before we're back
on the 7th. That might be a little optimistic, but
we will focus our work in the next couple weeks. So
we will see you back here on the other issues on the
7th, and we'll go from there.
Any other questions, procedural issues, or
anything else?
MR. GROVER: Your Honor, we also had
scheduled a pretrial conference on May 21st, which is
two weeks after the 7th. And so depending on,
obviously, the Court's ruling here and the Court's
ruling on the 7th, we may need to adjust that
pretrial conference.
THE COURT: I understand. And I think that
will probably, really, I think we'll probably have an
answer on the 7th, I'm guessing, if we're going to
35
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change those dates.
So I guess come -- I have not looked at that
at length, so I don't know what's going to happen on
the 7th, but come prepared for either way; if it's
going to be continued out, maybe bring some dates
that are available going forward.
Again, I appreciate the parties'
preparation, comments, and we'll take this under
advisement as of today. Thank you.
MR. ANGELL: Thank you.
MR. GROVER: Thank you.
{The proceedings concluded at 9:50 a.m.)
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2

STATE OF IDAHO
3

COUNTY OF CASSIA
4

5

I, PATRICIA E. HUBBELL, Certified Shorthand

6

Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of

7

Idaho, do hereby certify:

8
9

That pursuant to a notice of appeal, the
foregoing proceedings were reported in machine

10

shorthand by me and thereafter reduced to typewriting

11

by me and that the foregoing transcript contains a

12

verbatim record of said proceedings to the fullest

13

extent possible.

14

I further certify that I am not related to

15

any of the parties nor do I have any interest,

16

financial or otherwise, in the cause of action of

17

which said proceeding was a part.

18

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my

19

hand and affixed my seal of office this 23rd day of

20

September, 2018.

21
22
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03-22-19
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA
VICTOR ROGER BLISS,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,
vs.
MINIDOKA IRRIGATION DISTRICT,
Defendant/Counterclaimant.
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)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2017-334

______________________________________________________________________________
DECISION AND ORDER RE: ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
______________________________________________________________________________
On August 6, 2018 the Court entered a Final Judgment in the above-entitled matter. On
August 14, 2018 the defendant, Minidoka Irrigation District (MID) filed a Memorandum of
Attorney Fees & Costs together with an Affidavit in support.
On August 28, 2018 the plaintiff, Victor Roger Bliss (Bliss) filed an Objection and
Motion to Disallow Attorney Fees and Costs and an Affidavit in support of the motion. The
parties filed briefs in support of and in opposition to the motion to disallow attorney fees and
costs.
On October 15, 2018 a telephonic hearing was conducted on the motion to disallow
attorney fees and costs. Counsel Jonathan R. Grover appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff and
Counsel Sam L. Angell appeared on behalf of the Defendant. The defendant argues that it is the
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prevailing party and that as such it is entitled to costs as a matter of right (deposition costs and
filing fee) and attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 6-918A. The plaintiff argues that there is no
prevailing party and therefore there should be no award of attorney fees or costs. Alternatively, if
the defendant is the prevailing party, the plaintiff argues that it would not be equitable to award
costs to the defendant. As to the issue of attorney fees the plaintiff argues that there is no clear
and convincing evidence of bad faith on the part of the plaintiff to justify such an award.
Alternatively, if there is a statutory basis for attorney fees, the fees should be apportioned.
I.
STANDARD AND ANALYSIS
A.

Prevailing Party
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs,
the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of
the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court
in its sound discretion may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part
and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may apportion the costs between
and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the
issues and claims involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments
obtained.

I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B).
The Court's determination of whether a party prevailed is a matter of discretion. Zenner v.
Holcomb, 147 Idaho 444, 447, 210 P.3d 552, 555 (2009). There are three principal factors a trial
court must consider when determining which party, if any, prevailed: (1) the final judgment or
result obtained in relation to the relief sought; (2) whether there were multiple claims or issues
between the parties; and (3) the extent to which each of the parties prevailed on each of the
claims or issues. Nguyen v. Bui, 146 Idaho 187, 192, 191 P.3d 1107, 1112 (Ct. App. 2008).
“Further, the prevailing party determination is based on the action as a whole. Oakes, 152 Idaho
at 545, 272 P.3d at 517. The question is not to be examined claim-by-claim. Eighteen Mile, 141
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Idaho at 719, 117 P.3d at 133.” City of Middleton v. Coleman Homes, LLC, 163 Idaho 716, ___,
418 P.3d 1225, 1232 (2018).
“In determining which party prevailed in an action where there are claims and
counterclaims between opposing parties, the court determines who prevailed ‘in
the action.’ That is, the prevailing party question is examined and determined
from an overall view, not a claim-by-claim analysis.” Eighteen Mile Ranch,
L.L.C., v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 719, 117 P.3d 130, 133
(2005).
Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 148 Idaho 536, 538, 224 P.3d 1125, 1127 (2010)
In Schroeder v. Partin, 151 Idaho 471, 478, 259 P.3d 617, 624 (2011) the Court indicated
that the trial court does have the discretion to find both parties to be prevailing parties. Bliss filed
his complaint alleging five Counts seeking either damages and/or declaratory/injunctive relief.
MID filed a Counterclaim alleging two claims of relief seeking either damages and/or
declaratory/injunctive relief. The Court ultimately entered final judgment after granting summary
judgment wherein the Court dismissed plaintiff’s claims for relief and dismissed or remanded
defendant’s claims for relief. When the Court examines the case as a whole, each party prevailed
in the defense of the other’s claims. MID has sought costs and attorney fees as a prevailing party
in the defense of the claims asserted by Bliss. Bliss has not sought attorney fees or costs as the
prevailing party in the defense of the counterclaim. Both parties have prevailed in the defense of
the respective claims of the other party. As to the defense of the Complaint filed by Bliss, MID is
the prevailing party.1
B.

Costs as a matter of right.
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(C) a prevailing party may recover certain costs as a matter

of right. In this case MID seeks such costs consisting of the filing fee ($136.00) for their Answer
to the Complaint and Depositions ($1,645.96) taken in the case. Court filing fees claim by MID
1

Bliss would have been found to be the prevailing party in the defense of the counterclaim had he sought attorney
fees and costs, which he has not.
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are awardable pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(C)(i). The cost of the reporting and transcribing of
depositions taken in preparation for trial of an action are also recoverable as a matter of right.
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(C)(x). The parties participated in the taking of depositions of Mr. Bliss and
employees or board members of MID consisting of Mr. Hunt, Goff, Warr, Davidson and Ms.
Bailes. The deposition testimony was obviously taken for purposes of trial preparation and all of
the depositions were used in support of and in opposition to the motions for summary judgment.
A review of the deposition testimony taken from the witnesses and parties identified above was
primarily related to the claims of Mr. Bliss and while there was some testimony related to the
counterclaim of MID it is clear that such testimony was very minor in relation to the claims of
Mr. Bliss. While Mr. Bliss may have incurred substantial costs in the pursuit of his own claims
the court does not find that equity would require the Court to deny or reduce the costs sought by
MID. Therefore MID as the prevailing party in defense of claim of Bliss is hereby awarded costs
as a matter of right in the sum of $1,781.96.
C.

Attorney Fees pursuant to I.C. § 6-918A.
MID also seeks an award of attorney fees in the sum of $37,706.00 pursuant to I.C. § 6-

918A. Section 6-918A provides in relevant part as follows:
At the time and in the manner provided for fixing costs in civil actions, and at the
discretion of the trial court, appropriate and reasonable attorney fees may be
awarded to the claimant, the governmental entity or the employee of such
governmental entity, as costs, in actions under this act, upon petition therefor and
a showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that the party against whom or
which such award is sought was guilty of bad faith in the commencement,
conduct, maintenance or defense of the action..... The right to recover attorney
fees in legal actions for money damages that come within the purview of this act
shall be governed exclusively by the provisions of this act and not by any other
statute or rule of court, except as may be hereafter expressly and specifically
provided or authorized by duly enacted statute of the state of Idaho. (emphasis
added)
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An award of attorney fees to a prevailing party in under the Idaho Tort Claims Act is
discretionary with the trial court. Hill-Vu Mobile Home Park v. City of Pocatello, 162 Idaho 588,
599, 402 P.3d 1041, 1052 (2017). Therefore such an award is not mandatory. Further the party
requesting such attorney fees has the burden to present to the trial court “clear and convincing
evidence” that the non-prevailing party commenced, conducted or maintained the action in “bad
faith”. The term “bad faith” has been defined to be “dishonesty in belief or purpose”. Renzo v.
Idaho State Dep’t. of Agr., 149 Idaho 777, 782, 241 P.3d 950, 954 (2010). Essentially, MID
would have this court conclude that it is “bad faith” when a party files a claim that is barred by
the statute of limitations; when a party files a tort claim that is not sufficiently described within
the Notice of Tort Claim or when a party files an untimely notice of tort claim. It would appear
that MID would have this court equate “bad faith” with the filing of an action that is frivolous or
without merit or without reasonable basis in law or fact as set forth in I.C. §§ 12-121 or 12-117.
However, such is not the case. Renzo v. Idaho State Dep’t. of Agr., 149 Idaho at 781-782, 241
P.3d at 954-955. MID has not presented any evidence to the court as to the state of mind or his
purpose in the commencement of the action. Some examples of “bad faith” in the context of a
governmental tort claim could be the filing of a false or fraudulent notice of tort claim; the
intentional destruction of evidence related to a tort claim; the suborning of perjury to support a
tort claim; or the manufacturing of false evidence to support a tort claim. MID has not presented
to the court a sufficient factual basis or clear and convincing evidence of bad faith on the part of
Bliss to support an award of attorney fees. Block v. City of Lewiston, 156 Idaho 484, 490, 328
P.3d 464, 470 (2014).2 Therefore MID’s requests for attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 6-918A is
DENIED.
2

The mere fact that claims were dismissed as a matter of law does not establish or infer on the part of the losing
party that the commencement of an action was in bad faith. If that were the case the pursuit of MID’s claim for

5 - DECISION AND ORDER RE: ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

Page 469

II.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the reasons set forth above the Motion to Disallow Attorney Fees and Costs is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Court finds that the Defendant is the prevailing
party. The Defendant is GRANTED costs as a matter of right in the sum of $1,781.96. The
Defendant’s request for attorney fees pursuant to I.C. 6-918A is DENIED. The Court will enter
an Amended Judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: _________________________
Signed: 10/17/2018 09:21 AM

__________________________________________
John K. Butler, District Judge

trespass would be a basis for a finding of bad faith which certainly should not be and is not the law on this subject.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
document has been served as shown below on counsel of record (or self-represented party, if
Signed: 10/17/2018 04:57 PM
any) on _________________________:
Via Email
Jonathan R. Grover
Attorney for Plaintiff
jgrover@egb-law.com
Sam L. Angell
Attorney for Defendant
sla@hasattorneys.com

_______________________
Deputy Clerk
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Filed: 10/17/2018 16:21:15
Fifth Judicial District, Minidoka County
Tonya Page, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Sunderland, Janet

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA
VICTOR RODGER BLISS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MINIDOKA IRRIGATION DISTRICT,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2017-334

______________________________________________________________________________
AMENDED JUDGMENT
______________________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
1. On the Plaintiff’s Complaint in favor of the defendant, Minidoka Irrigation District
and against the Plaintiff, Victor Rodger Bliss, and the Plaintiff’s Complaint is hereby
dismissed.
2. On the Defendant’s Counterclaim in favor of the Counter-defendant, Victor Rodger
Bliss and against the Counterclaimant, Minidoka Irrigation District as to Count I,
Trespass and the Counterclaim is dismissed as to Count I.
3. As to Count II of the Defendant’s Counterclaim for Declaratory Relief, the
Counterclaim is dismissed and the issue of the removal of the encroachment is
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remanded to the Minidoka Irrigation District for further proceedings in accordance
with I.C. § 42-1209.
4. The Defendant, Minidoka Irrigation District, as the prevailing party, is awarded costs
against the Plaintiff, Victor Roger Bliss in the sum of $1,781.96.
DATED: _________________________
Signed: 10/17/2018 09:22 AM

__________________________________________
John K. Butler, District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
document has been served as shown below on counsel of record (or self-represented party, if
Signed: 10/17/2018 04:55 PM
any) on _________________________:
Via Email
Jonathan R. Grover
Attorney for Plaintiff
jgrover@egb-law.com
Sam L. Angell
Attorney for Defendant
sla@hasattorneys.com

3 - AMENDED JUDGMENT

Page 474

~

_______________________
Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA

Victor Rodger Bliss
vs.
Minidoka Irrigation District

Supreme Court No. 46374-2018
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

I, Janet Sunderland, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho in and for the County of Minidoka, do hereby certify
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the course
of this action.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court on this the ______
day of December
October, 2018.
3rd
TONYA PAGE
Clerk of the Court
Seal
By: Janet Sunderland
Deputy Clerk

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this date, I served a copy of the attached to:
Blake G. Hall
Sam L Angell
Jonathan R. Grover

bgh@hasattorneys.com
sla@hasattorneys.com
jgrover@egb-law.com

[X] By E-mail
[X] By E-mail
[X] By E-mail

Tonya Page
Clerk of the Court
December 3, 2018
Dated:______________
10/04/2018

By: Janet Sunderland
Deputy Clerk

Certificate of Exhibits - D (MISC28)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA

Victor Rodger Bliss
vs.
Minidoka Irrigation District

Case No. CV-2017-334
Clerk’s Certificate of Service

I, Janet Sunderland, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, of the State
of Idaho, in and for the County of Minidoka, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing
Record in the above entitled cause was electronically compiled at my direction, and is a true, full
and correct Record of the pleadings and documents as requested by the parties.
I further certify that I have caused to be served the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript (if

□ all Exhibits offered or admitted; X No Exhibits submitted; □
Pre-sentence Investigation, or
□ Other Confidential Documents; or □ Confidential Exhibits (if
requested), along with copies of

applicable) to each of the Attorneys of Record or Parties in this case as follows:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on October
____,
December
3 2018, I served a copy of the attached to:
12th
Blake G. Hall
Sam L Angell
Jonathan R. Grover

Dated: ______________

bgh@hasattorneys.com
sla@hasattorneys.com
jgrover@egb-law.com

[X] By E-mail
[X] By E-mail
[X] By E-mail

Tonya Page
Clerk of the Court
By: Janet Sunderland
Deputy Clerk

Clerk’s Certificate of Service – Revised 07/01/2018
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA

Victor Rodger Bliss
vs.
Minidoka Irrigation District

Supreme Court No. 46183-2018
CLERK’S CERTIFICATE TO THE RECORD

I, Tonya Page, Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in
and for the County of Minidoka, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in the
above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction and is a true, full and correct record of,
the pleadings and documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.

I do further certify that copies of all documents, charts and pictures offered or admitted as
exhibits in a trial or hearing in the above-entitled cause will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the
Supreme Court, along with the Court Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record, except that
pictures or depictions of child pornography shall not be copied and sent to the parties or the
Supreme Court unless specifically ordered by the court. Documentary exhibits in pdf format
may be sent to the Supreme Court on a CD that includes an index. All other exhibits shall be
retained by the clerk of the district court as required by Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court on this the ______
day
of October, 2018.
3rd
day of
December
12th
TONYA PAGE
Clerk of the Court
Seal
By: Janet Sunderland
Deputy Clerk

Clerk’s Certificate to the Record - D (MISC30)
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Filed: December 3, 2018 at 12:06 PM
Fifth Judicial District, Minidoka County
Tonya Page, Clerk of the Court
By: Janet Sunderland Deputy Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Victor Rodger Bliss
vs.
Minidoka Irrigation District

Supreme Court No. 46374-2018
District Court No. CV-2017-334
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME BY
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT
Event Code: MOET

Janet Sunderland, the Clerk for the District Court, who is preparing the record in this case,
hereby moves this Court for an extension of time to prepare and lodge the record until
December 31, 2018.
1. The date for lodging the record is December 03, 2018.
2. Were any previous extensions granted in whole or in part? No.
3. I have completed pages of the record out of an estimated total of pages.
4.

I am requesting an extension of 28 days for the following reasons: To allow service on
parties and time for any objection to record

5. I have contacted counsel for the parties and there is X no objection by counsel to the
request for an extension.
6. I was unable to file this motion five days before the record was due because: I have
been having some difficulty with my reminder report and lost track of the status of this
appeal.
TONYA PAGE
Clerk of the Court

Dated: 12/03/2018

By: Janet Sunderland
Deputy Clerk

Motion for Extension - D (MISC31)
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